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INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, some of the most pressing issues in U.S. politics have
concerned either international trade or federalism. On the international trade
front, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") was fiercely debated during and after the 1992 U.S. presidential election (who can forget Ross
Perot's prediction of a "giant sucking sound" of U.S. jobs moving south to Mexico?);' the World Trade Organization ("WTO") protests in Seattle in 1999 revealed deep-seated ambivalence about globalization; 2 and increased trade with
China has been both long desired (cheaper goods) and long feared (job loss, loss
of economic power).3 On the federalism front, devolution of power to U.S.
states has been a central tenet of Republican ideology since the 1994 federal
election, and the excessive size and scope of the U.S. federal government is a
core focus of the modern Tea Party movement. 5
I

Andrew

Farrell,

'Giant Sucking Sound,' Part Deux, FORBES, July 15, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/15/perot-nafta-taxes-biz-billies-cx-af 0715perotroundtwo.html.
2
Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: Senseless in Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at 2,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/01/opinion/foreign-affairs-senseless-in-seattle.html
(commenting on anti-WTO protesters and their objections to the WTO); Brian Knowlton, Clinton
Arrives; Seattle Restricts Further Protests: Riots Cast Cloud Over WTO Talks, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
2, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/02/news/02iht-wto.2.t_0.html?pagewanted=all (characterizing anti-WTO protests as "of a magnitude unseen in the United States since the anti-Vietnam
War and civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s and '70s").
Ned Barker, US. Trade With China: Expectations vs. Reality, PBS.oRG, Nov. 16, 2004,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/china/trade.html (discussing the scope
and size of China's manufacturing sector); James Fallows, China Makes, the World Takes, THE
ATLANTIC,
July-Aug.
2007,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/07/china-makes-the-world-takes/5987/
("Americans complain about cheap junk pouring out of Chinese mills, but they rely on China for a
lot that is not junk, and whose cheap price is important to American industrial and domestic life.
Modem consumer culture rests on the assumption that the nicest, most advanced goodscomputers, audio systems, wall-sized TVs-will get cheaper year by year."); Report blames China trade for 2.4 mln lost US jobs, REUTERS, Mar. 23, 2010, available at
(reporting
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/23/usa-china-trade-idUSN2324379920100323
findings of Economic Policy Institute study of U.S. job losses from 2001 to 2008).
4
The Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 104th Congress
(1995-1997) prepared and presented their "Contract with America," a central focus of which was
reduction in the size and scope of the federal government. Republican Contract With America, U.
at
REPRESENTATIVES,
available
HOUSE
OF
S.
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html ("This year's election [1994] offers the
chance, after four decades of one-party control, to bring to the House a new majority that will
transform the way Congress works. That historic change would be the end of government that is
too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money."). In 1995, newly minted U.S. Senate majority leader Robert Dole declared, "If I have one goal for the 104th Congress, it is this: that
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In other words, federalism and international trade regulation issues are
important national concerns. Such issues are also often interrelated, especially
as the importance of international trade to the U.S. economy has grown in recent
decades. What is surprising, however, is that federalism and international trade
matters are often addressed separately, rather than as interrelated subjects. Even
when they share a strong nexus, such as with the current foment about nonresident aliens (a matter of trade in services) 6 and state laws concerning them,'
we will dust off the Tenth Amendment and restore it to its rightful place in our Constitution."
Timothy Lynch, A Smooth Transition: Crime, Federalism, and the GOP, in THE REPUBLICAN
REVOLUTION 10 YEARS LATER, SMALLER GOVERNMENT OR BUSINESS AS USUAL? 213 (Chris Edwards & John Samples eds., 2005).
"We, the members of The Tea Party Patriots, are inspired by our founding documents and
regard the Constitution of the United States to be the supreme law of the land. We believe that it is
possible to know the original intent of the government our founders set forth, and stand in support
of that intent. Like the founders, we support states' rights for those powers not expressly stated in
the Constitution. As the government is of the people, by the people and for the people, in all other
matters we support the personal liberty of the individual, within the rule of law." About the Tea
Party
Patriots,
TEA
PARTY
911,
http://www.teaparty9l1.com/info/locations/tea partypatriots.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2012)
[hereinafter Tea Party Mission Statement]. See also About Tea Party Patriots, TEA PARTY
PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (setting forth the Tea
Party movement's core principle of constitutionally limited government).
6
For a general discussion of this nexus, see William Thomas Worster, Conflicts Between
United States Immigration Law and the GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services: Most-FavoredNation Obligation,42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 55, 64 (2006).
For example Arizona's Senate Bill 1070, enacted as the "Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act," S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (enacted) has received
widespread national attention, as has Alabama's anti-immigrant bill, H.R. 56, Reg. Sess. (Ala.
2011). Both laws have been challenged on federalism grounds. See United States v. Alabama,
813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz.
2010) (granting preliminary injunction), affd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 845 (2011); Hispanic Interest Coal. of Alabama v. Bentley, No. 5:11 -CV-02484-SLB, 2011
WL 5516953 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011).
News reports on both laws have been voluminous. Articles concerning Arizona S.B. 1070 include
Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html (discussing the signing, by Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, of this state law intended "to identify, prosecute and deport illegal immigrants," and reactions to this law) and Alan Gomez, Ariz. Immigration law strains U.S-Latin
America relations, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-1 116-arizona-immigration-law-latin-americaN.htm (discussing the effect of S.B. 1070 on U.S.Latin American relations). News reports concerning Alabama House Bill 56 include Patrik
Jonsson, Why Republicans Are Doingan About-Face on Tough Alabama Immigration Law, ABC
NEwS (Nov. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/m/story?id=14967434&sid=81 and Julia Preston,
In Alabama, a Harsh Bill for Residents Here Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04immig.html?_r-1 &ref-arizonaimmigrationlawsbl 070.
For a recent academic treatment of Arizona S.B. 1070, see Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B.
1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and Disenfranchisement, 14 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 35
(2011).
While Alabama's H.B. 56 has proven problematic because it has adversely affected Alabama's
economy, the federalism-related aspects of Arizona's S.B. 1070 have remained a central bone of
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or with the state procurement laws in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,8

the discussion and analysis is typically more about foreign affairs generally
than about the regulation of international trade specifically.9
A closer look at the relationship between international trade regulation
and federalism is therefore warranted. International trade has become a central
part of international law since World War 11,10 and the fact that international
trade has grown rapidly in recent decades" means that efforts to regulate (inpolitical contention. After the Obama Administration briefly referenced Arizona S.B. 1070 in a
report to the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights, Arizona Governor Jan
Brewer wrote a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Clinton, stating that "[t]he idea of our own American government submitting the duly enacted laws of a state of the United States to 'review' by the
United Nations is internationalism run amok and unconstitutional." See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SUBMITTED TO THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, para. 95, at 23-24

(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/146379.pdf ("A recent Arizona
law, S.B. 1070, has generated significant attention and debate at home and around the world. The
issue is being addressed in a court action that argues that the federal government has the authority
to set and enforce immigration law. That action is ongoing; parts of the law are currently enjoined."). See also Jonathan J. Cooper, Jan Brewer: UN Human Rights Report 'Downright Offensive', Remove Reference to Arizona Immigration Law, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 27, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/29/jan-brewer-un-human-rightn _698427.html.
530 U.S. 363 (2000). See infra text accompanying notes 80-83 for further discussion.
9
But see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 315, 376-77 (1997); Edward T. Hayes, A Comparative Analysis of the Regulation of State and ProvincialGovernments in
NAFTA and GATT/WTO, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 605 (2005); Mark A. Luz & C. Marc Miller, Note,
Globalization and Canadian Federalism: Implications of the NAFTA's Investment Rules, 47
McGILL L. J. 951 (2002); Matthew Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential
for International Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions With Respect to SubFederal Governments?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 609 (Winter-Spring 1996-1997) (discussing
the implications of federalism in the context of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas); Matthew Schaefer, Searchingfor Pareto Gains in the RelationshipBetween Free Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing theFTAA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 441 (1997) [hereinafter Schaefer,
Pareto Gains].
10

See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL

32 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that "[i]nternational economic relations under
international law are primarily governed by treaties, rather than by customary law," and that "[i]n
many cases, the treaties establish organizations," including key international trade organizations),
See also Michael H. Davis & Dana Neascu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherenceof Free Trade
Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of PoliticalEconomy, 69 UMKC L.
REv. 733, 751 (2001) ("International trade law has become one of the newest branches of public
international law.").
"
See RICHARD A. EASTERLIN, GROWTH TRIUMPHANT: THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 40-41 (1998) (noting rapid growth in international trade since World
War II); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1987, at 43 (1987) ("By the mid-1950s...
the world economy entered a period of unprecedented output and trade expansion .... .").
U.S. and Canadian trade statistics dramatically illustrate the importance of international trade to
those two countries. For example, in 1960, U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), adjusted for
inflation (to 2009 dollars), was US$3,815 billion, of which about 9.5% consisted of imports and
exports of goods and services (the unadjusted figures were US$526.4 billion and US$49.8 billion,
respectively). By 2005, U.S. GDP had grown more than three-fold to US$13,587 billion (again
ECONOMIC RELATIONS

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol114/iss3/9

4

Bowman: U.S. and Canadian Federalism: Implications for International Trad
2012]

US. AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM

1011

cluding to liberalize) international trade are a central part of modem foreign
relations (as both a means to increase national power and a way to exercise it).12
How, then, do states and provinces fit into this framework? International Law is
largely unitary in nature, meaning that subnational 3 units (i.e., states and provinces) are not recognized as international actors in their own right. 14 If subnational units do act, they therefore must do so either through their country's national governance structure, or they must act independently, with tacit consent
or benign neglect by their national government. And when subnational units do
take actions pertaining to international trade, what is the effect? Does federalism
sometimes impede the development of coherent national policies and positions
on international trade regulation? If so, could that not only prevent effective
national regulation of international trade, but also hinder a country's involvement in the development of International Law concerning international trade?
What might that suggest about the role of federalism in a world increasingly
adjusted for inflation to 2009 dollars), and U.S. international trade in goods and services (also
adjusted for inflation to 2009 dollars) had grown an astonishing ten-fold in volume to US$3,661.5
billion and comprised 26.9% of U.S. GDP (the unadjusted figures were US$12,368 billion and
US$3,333 billion, respectively). Four short years later, in 2009 (in the midst of the global financial
crisis), U.S. GDP was US$14,256 billion, and U.S. imports and exports of goods and services
totaled US$3,521 billion, or 24.7% of U.S. GDP. See BUREAU OF EcoN. ANALYSIS, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). The
adjustment for inflation was made using the U.S. Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index
(CP) inflation calculator, which is available online at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl and
http://www.bls.gov/datalinflationcalculator.htm.
Canadian international trade data for years prior to 2005 is somewhat more difficult to obtain, but
in 2005 Canadian GDP (adjusted for inflation to 2009 dollars) was CDN$1,326 billion, and Canadian imports and exports of goods and services for that year totaled CDN$1,054 billion, or 79% of
Canadian GDP (the unadjusted figures were CDN$1,240 billion and CDN$985 billion, respectively). By 2009 (in the midst of the global financial crisis), Canadian GDP had increased to
CDN$1,368 billion, and Canadian imports and exports of goods and services totaled CDN$900.5
billion, or 65.8% of Canadian GDP. See Gross Domestic Product, at Basic Prices, by Industry,
STATISTICS CAN.,
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/101/cst0l/econ41-eng.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012); Canada's Balance of International Payments (Current Account),
STATISTICS CAN., http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/101/cst0l/econ0la-eng.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012). The 2005 and 2009 figures in the latter table are chained 2002 (inflation-adjusted) figures that have been un-chained here using Statistics Canada's CPI indices for
2005 and 2009. See The Consumer Price Index for Canada tbl.5, STATISTICS CAN.,
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/62-001-x/2010005/t040-eng.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
12
David Baldwin conceptually classifies "economic techniques" as a subset of statecraft generally. See DAVID A. BALDWIN, EcoNoMIC STATECRAFT 15-16 (1985). The upshot is that as international trade levels have increased in the post-World War II era, international trade has become
ever more central to foreign relations.
13
The term "substatal" is sometimes used as well, and in a sense that term is more accurate,
given that a country (or state, in International Law parlance) is not the same thing as a "nation."
This Article, however, will use the term "subnational" to avoid confusion between U.S. states and
states at the international level.
14
See LOUIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed.
1996) ("At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards U.S. foreign
relations, the states 'do not exist."').
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characterized by high levels of international trade and economic interdependency?
These are important questions. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is
to consider more fully the relationship between the regulation of international
trade and federalism. While the subject could be addressed from a number of
perspectives, this Article will focus on two. First, this Article will compare U.S.
federalism and Canadian federalism, in order to better appreciate how differences between the two systems-which share common colonial origins-affect
these countries' regulation of international trade. Second, this Article will examine U.S. and Canadian federalism through the lens of traditional regional trade
theory. Both approaches offer useful insights.
With respect to the first perspective, a comparative analysis of U.S. and
Canadian federalism demonstrates that despite their common colonial origins,
the U.S. and Canadian federal systems of government are characterized by significant differences in form and effect regarding their regulation of international
trade." In the United States, federal power over international trade matters is
presumptive, although not absolute, and it extends to activities that are intrastate
in nature. In Canada, by contrast, while the federal government holds the authority to make international trade decisions, the federal government's implementation and enforcement of these decisions is far more restrained by provincial authority over intra-provincial matters. In other words, the Canadian federal government has much less ability to preempt provincial actions or laws in the international trade arena, and this has resulted in a far different approach in Canada
to the regulation of international trade.
With respect to the second perspective, regional trade agreements and
federal systems of government share important similarities that make the application of regional trade theory to national federal systems a useful exercise.
Regional trade agreements are, by definition, concerned with the regulation of
cross-border trade. Also, and more importantly, both federal systems and regional trade agreements consist of separate political units that have been combined into a larger whole, and both are characterized by decisions about the allocation of decision-making power between a lower level (the separate political
units that comprise the federal system or the regional trade agreement) and a
higher level (the federal government or some sort of regional trade agreement
authority, such as the European Commission within the European Union). 16 In
some regional trade agreements or organizations there actually may be little or
no "higher level" authority, and the agreement may be largely or entirely horiIs See infra Part IV. For a general comparative overview of Canadian and U.S. federalism, see
Ronald J. Watts, The American Constitution in Comparative Perspective: A Comparison of Federalism in the United States and Canada,74 J. AM. HisT. 769 (1987); L. Kinvin Wroth, Notesfor
a ComparativeStudy of the Origins of Federalism in the United States and Canada, 15 ARz. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 93 (1998).
16
See Schaefer, Pareto Gains, supra note 9, at 443-45 (discussing the implications of federalism in the context of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas).
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zontal between the countries involved' 7-but that too is a decision about the
allocation of power.
Thus, in a very basic and important sense, the degree of allocation (and
degree of retention) of sovereignty is the central difference between federal systems of government-in which there is a significant ceding of sovereignty from
the lower level to the higher level-and regional trade agreements-in which
typically there is far less (and perhaps no) sovereignty ceded. In light of this
commonality, application of regional trade theory to the federal structures of
government in Canada and the United States yields interesting insights into how
these two countries regulate their international trade, and also suggests how
differences between U.S. and Canadian federalism might affect these countries'
abilities to both effectively regulate their own international trade and to influence the future development of international trade law at the multilateral level.
In other words, regional trade theory can help us not only explain the differences between U.S. and Canadian federalism and international trade regulation,
but also predict what difficulties each country may face in formulating unified
positions on international trade matters and advancing its national interests within the multilateral trade community.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II sets the definitional stage by
explaining what is meant in this Article by the term "international trade regulation." The term is too often undefined, which can hinder meaningful analysis.
Part III places the discussion of modern federalism and international trade in
historical context by considering Baron de Montesquieu's remarks about federalism and international trade in his seminal work, The Spirit ofLaws. 5 MontesSee Matthew W. Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium, 9 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J., Winter 2000, at 25, 33. Barrier equates "deepening theory" with vertical integration and "broadening theory" with horizontal integration, which is accurate in a sense, but not
entirely in keeping with the traditional definitions of vertical integration (in terms of supply chains
and production) and horizontal integration (in terms of monopolization). See infra text accompanying notes 175-178.
The details regarding such allocations of power vary. The WTO, despite its greater emphasis (as
compared to the GATT) on enforcement mechanisms for trade disputes, nonetheless remains
largely focused on trade liberalization via consensus-a fact that helps to explain the continued
Doha Round impasse. See Decision Making art. IX, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh
Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legale/04-wto e.htm ("The WTO
shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947."). In
some instances there can be parallel mechanisms (rather than a higher level mechanism), such as
binational panel review for trade remedy disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAFTA binational panel mechanism exists as an alternative for review of
trade remedy disputes in U.S. or Canadian courts, and in that sense it represents a decision about
the allocation of power. See GREGORY W. BOWMAN, NICK COVELLI, DAVID A. GANTZ & IHN Ho
UHfm, TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 15, 24 (2010); David A. Gantz, The United States and
Dispute Settlement under the North American Free Trade Agreement: Ambivalence, Frustration
and Occasional Defiance, in THE SwoRD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 356, 362-64 (Cesare P.R. Romano ed., 2009).
1s
See infra note 30.
17
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quieu's work profoundly influenced the drafters of the U.S. Constitution and the
resulting U.S. government's federal structure, 9 and his thinking on the promotion of peace through trade has become a core tenet of international trade regulation in the post-World War II era.20 Part IV discusses the federal structures of
government in the U.S. and Canada and considers how international trade regulatory powers are allocated in each country between the federal (national) government and subnational governments (those of the U.S. states and Canadian
provinces). Part V then provides an overview of certain aspects of regional trade
theory that are relevant to this Article and applies these theoretical features to
the relationships between the U.S. federal government and U.S. states and between the Canadian federal government and Canadian provinces. Part VI offers
concluding observations.
II.

"INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION" DEFINED

In order to meaningfully discuss international trade regulation in Canada and the United States (or anywhere else, for that matter), it is important to
first define what is meant by the term "international trade regulation." Perhaps
surprisingly, this definitional step is too often skipped in international trade literature, possibly because the term "international trade regulation" is seemingly
self-defining. Yet ambiguity lurks beneath such facial clarity. On the one hand,
the term is sometimes used as a synonym for "international economic law"that is, those multilateral (primarily WTO) legal rules concerning cross-border
trade in products, services, and capital.2' On the other hand, the term "international trade regulation" is also used to describe any and all domestic efforts to
regulate cross-border trade, be they steps to implement multilateral rules, set up
regional trade agreements or bilateral investment treaties, or take some unilateral action to regulate cross-border trade (such as unilateral trade sanctions). 22In
still other cases, the term "international trade law" is used broadly to refer to any
and all governmental efforts to regulate or govern cross-border trade, whether
multilateral, regional, or unilateral in scope.23
Clearly, some tighter definitional focus is beneficial. Because this Article concerns the legal architecture and policy aims of U.S. and Canadian crossborder trade, the term "international trade regulation" is defined herein as governmental activity to develop and implement the legal rules and policy goals for
Robert Howse, Montesqueiu on Commerce, Conquest, War, and Peace, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 1, 1 (2006).
20
See infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
21
See KEVIN C. KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: READING, CASES, NOTES AND
19

PROBLEMS, at xxiii (2008). It is also worth noting, for readers less familiar with the subject of
international trade regulation, that "international economic law" is not the same thing as "international economics." ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIC LAW 1-8 (2d ed. 2008).
22
LOWENFELD, supra note 21, at 1-8.
23
See generally RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (2008).
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cross-border trade. This definition is similar to the definition of "international
trade law" set forth above, but it is also broader, because it also embraces the
formulation of policy.
Similarly, the term "international trade regulatory power" is defined for
purposes of this Article as the scope and allocation of authority to regulate
cross-border trade. This authority is best thought of as a subset of each country's
foreign affairs power. Indeed, thinking of international trade regulation as a subset of foreign affairs helps clarify how international trade fits into each country's brand of federalism for two reasons. First, international trade can be both
the means through which foreign policy goals are achieved, as well as the foreign policy goals themselves. Second, in other instances international trade may
serve only as the means for implementing other foreign policy goals. This is a
distinction that is not always made in international trade law literature, and in
the context of federalism it is an important distinction to bear in mind.
The first point is well-illustrated by NAFTA.24 NAFTA was intended to
promote greater U.S., Canadian, and Mexican economic prosperity, and it was
generally considered to be the end goal in and of itself.2 5 The second pointinternational trade regulation as a means or tool of foreign policy, not an endis well-illustrated by efforts of the George W. Bush Administration to establish
a Middle East Free Trade Area ("MEFTA") with various countries in that region-many of them quite small. The primary purpose of MEFTA was not to
promote U.S. economic growth by establishing deeper integrative ties with relatively small economies in the Middle East; rather, the purpose of MEFTA was
to foster support in that region for U.S. foreign policy and economic goals.26
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
at
http://www.nafta-secavailable
NAFTA],
[hereinafter
(1993)
alena.org/en/view.aspx?conlD=590&mtpilD=ALL.
25
Ranko Shiraki Oliver, In the Twelve Years of NAFTA, the Treaty Gave to Me... What,
Exactly?: An Assessment of Economic, Social, and PoliticalDevelopments in Mexico Since 1994
and Their Impact On Mexican Immigration into the United States, 10 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 53,
57-58 (2007) ("The signatories hoped that, over time, the regional economic integration established by NAFTA would create a market similar to that of the European Union and the European
Free Trade Association combined, and that it would permit the economies of the three countries to
work together with the goal of increasing international competitiveness, employment, and income
throughout the region."). Specifically, the NAFTA states, "The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, resolved to: STRENGTHEN the special bonds of friendship and cooperation among their nations;
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation." NAFTA, supra note 24, at 297.
26
See Gregory W. Bowman, The Domestic and InternationalPolicy Implications of "Deep"
versus "Broad"PreferentialTrade Agreements, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 510 (2009).
MEFTA was to be established in phases via free trade agreements with individual countries in the
region; it was unsuccessful. While MEFTA itself did not come to pass, it did lead to U.S. free
trade agreements with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. See Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last
visited Apr. 6, 2012).
24
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Von Clauswitz famously stated that war is diplomacy by other means;27 we can
also observe (as noted in the Introduction above) that trade is diplomacy by other means. And given the importance of international trade to the U.S. and Canadian economies-in 2009, for example, imports and exports of goods and services represented approximately 25% of U.S. GDP 2 8 and 72% of Canadian
GDP 29-international trade regulation is a centrally important part of U.S. and
Canadian economic and foreign policy activities.
III. MONTESQUIEU, FEDERALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

International trade issues and questions concerning federalism are by no
means new subjects. Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, addressed
both topics in 1748's The Spirit ofLaws ("De l'espritdes lois"), 30 but he did not
explore the links between the two. Instead, Montesquieu separately discussed
the benefits of federalism and the promotion of peace through international
trade. On the subject of federalism, Montesquieu concluded, in Book IX of The
Spirit ofLaws, that a federal republic-a "society of societies"-was a desirable
and viable means to balance local (subnational) interests in good governance
with national interests of self defense.3 1 This thought deeply influenced the
American founding fathers 32 and, by extension, the founding fathers of Cana-

CARL VON CLAUSWITZ, ON WAR 119 (Anatol Rapoport ed., J.J. Graham trans., Penguin
Books 1968) ("War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.").
28
In 2009, U.S. GDP was US$14,256 billion, and U.S. imports and exports of goods and
27

services totaled US$3,521 billion. See BUREAU OF EcoN. ANALYSIS, supra note 11.
29
In 2009, Canadian GDP was CDN$1,368 billion, and Canadian imports and exports of
goods and services totaled CDN$900.5 billion. See Gross Domestic Product, at Basic Prices, by
Industry, supra note 11; Canada'sBalance of International Payments (Current Account), supra
note 11. The figures in the latter table are chained 2002 (inflation-adjusted) figures that have been
un-chained here using Statistics Canada's CPI index. See The Consumer Price Index for Canada,
supra note 11.
30
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. IX (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller &
Harold S. Stone eds. & trans., 1989).
31
Id. at 131. The original French "une socidtd de societies" was first translated into English in
1750 by translator Thomas Nugent as an "assemblage of societies." See BARON DE
MONTESEQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. IX (Thomas Nugent trans., Cosimo Classics 2011).
32
THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) ("The definition
of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be 'an assemblage of societies,' or an association of two or more states into one state."); Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu's Theory of Government and the Framingof the American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1990) ("What
is significant here is that Madison envisioned the federal system as an ideological confederation; a
unity of ideas. Federalism is based on a common principle shared among the states. By urging
citizens to adopt the proposed Constitution, Madison urged them to accept certain principles of
republican governance and acknowledge certain socio-cultural uniformity amidst their disparate
state interests. Thus, while states were free to differ over the implementation of republican government, the principle of republican government, as described by Montesquieu, provided that the
unitary whole be greater than the sum of the disparate parts."). For a careful application of how
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da. With respect to international trade, Montesquieu famously stated, in Book
XX of The Spirit of Laws, that international trade can promote peace between
countrieS34-a notion that remains highly prevalent today and serves as a normative core of the global trading system and its manifold efforts at trade liberalization.
his theory was specifically applied, see Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution and the History ofldeas, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1067, 1109-12 (2008).
33
See Michael Hale & Stephen Lange, Federalism and Representation in the Theory of the
Founding Fathers: A Comparative Study of US. and Canadian Constitutional Thought, 40
PUBLIUS: THE J. OF FEDERALISM 366, 382-83 (2010). To say that Montesquieu's thought was
influential, however, does not mean that the same lessons were drawn in Canada and the United
States. See Marc Chevrier, The Idea of Federalism Among the Founding Fathers of the United
States and Canada, in CONTEMPORARY CANADIAN FEDERALISM: FOUNDATIONS, TRADITIONS, AND
INSTITUTIONS 31-41 (Alain Gustave-Gaignon ed., 2009); William C. Hodge, Patriation of the
Canadian Constitution: ComparativeFederalism in a New Context, 60 WASH. L. REv. 585, 60107 (1985) ("The Canadians, assessing the American system in 1864-65, were understandably
distressed at what they saw as federal-state tensions run amuck. To avoid that paroxysm of state's
rights, they deliberately and expressly oriented their constitution around the center, following the
New Zealand model of executive control of provincial legislative capacity.").
34
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 30, at bk. XX, ch. 2 ("The natural effect of commerce is to bring
peace. Two nations that negotiate between themselves become reciprocally dependent, if one has
an interest in buying and the other in selling. And all unions are based on mutual needs."). As
Howse has observed, Montesquieu drew a distinction between "economic" trade, which could
lead to beneficial gains from trade and an interdependency that could promote peace, and "luxury"
trade, which he viewed as not beneficial and leading to instability and aggression. Howse, supra
note 19, at 9-13. A discussion of this normative distinction, while interesting, is beyond the scope
of this Article.
3
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17 ("Recognizing that their relations in the field of
trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development"); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-l1, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT], availableat http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/gatt47 01 e.htm
("Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of
the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods.").
This ideal appears in statements made at the national level as well. See, e.g., NATIONAL SECURITY
available
at
8-9,
28-29
(2010),
STRATEGY
("[A]
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/national securitystrategy.pdf
growing and open global economy serves as a source of opportunity for the American people and
a source of strength for the United States. This new foundation must underpin and sustain an
international economic system that is critical to both our prosperity and to the peace and security
of the world."); THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4, 32-33
(2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ ("America's national interests and moral values drive us in the same direction: to assist the world's poor citizens
and least developed nations and help integrate them into the global economy.... Development
reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping
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The liberalization of international trade was not a signature issue of
Montesquieu's era; indeed, it did not truly come into vogue until about sixty
years ago at the dawn of the GATT-WTO era.36 So it is no surprise that Montesquieu was silent on that matter. Yet if we link Montesquieu's two points about
federalism and international trade and consider them in the context of a world
characterized by international trade liberalization, several interesting and highly
relevant questions come into focus. And it is particularly appropriate to address
these questions in the context of U.S. and Canadian federalism, in light of Montesquieu's profound influence on these countries' federal structures.
An important initial question is whether it is possible to develop a taxof
onomy international trade matters that remain solely (or at least primarily) of
national concern, versus those that are of significant local concern. Or to state
matters differently, the question is whether any factual distinction between local
and national interests in international trade matters is (largely or wholly) a false
dichotomy.
Can a bright-line test based on form be used to draw an accurate factual
distinction between "national level" and "local level" activity? That is, is an
activity clearly "national level" activity if it relates in some way to cross-border
activity? Conversely, is an activity clearly "local level" activity if it pertains in
some way to local concerns? Or can some sort of "substantial impact" test be
employed-i.e., an activity can be considered a "national level" matter if it has a
substantial impact on national concerns, or be considered a "local level" activity
if it has a substantial impact on local concerns? 37 Or do such distinctions break
down because so many activities have substantial national and local dimento build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies."); THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
(2002), available at http://georgewbush1, 17-20
OF AMERICA
STATES
UNITED
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ ("A strong world economy enhances our national security
by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world.").
36
See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 5-6 (2d
ed. 1989) ("The postwar design for international trade policy was animated by a single-minded
concern to avoid repeating the disastrous errors of the 1920s and 1930s.... The first lesson, of
course, was the conclusion that the policy of trade restriction and discrimination had once and for
all been proven wrong.").
The substantial impact test was a judicial test used by U.S. courts, for a time, to determine
3
the procedural adequacy of certain federal agency actions. The essence of the substantial impact
test was that when an agency took a particular action (such as implementing a policy, procedure or
rule of some sort), it had to follow certain procedural requirements-namely, "notice and comment" rulemaking-if the action in question would have a "substantial impact" on affected parties. This of course was not a terribly bright-line test, and courts ceased using it after the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), because the test was seen as adding requirements for agency
informal rulemaking beyond those authorized by Congress. See generally William Funk, A Primer
on NonlegislativeRules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1322-23 (2001).
The point here is that the substantial impact test was an exercise in line-drawing based on impact,
not on form, and that a similar approach could be employed in attempting to distinguish between
domestic and international matters.
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sions? Moreover, even if such distinctions can be made on a static basis (i.e., at
a given point in time), do the distinctions change dynamically over time-and if
they do, is the rate of change so rapid as to render the exercise largely futile?
It is my view, at least for developed countries that are heavily involved
in international trade, that any efforts at drawing clear factual distinctions between local and national concerns pertaining to international trade will not be
terribly fruitful (in both static and dynamic terms), and that the local-national
dichotomy is an increasingly false one.18 As the volume of international trade in
the U.S. and Canadian economies continues to grow, any domestic-international
distinction promises to become ever more factually arbitrary, and ultimately
unworkable.
The fact that factual distinctions cannot be readily made, however, does
not mean that policy choices cannot be made regarding the allocation of international trade regulatory power within a country. There would seem to be three
primary policy choices for allocating international trade regulatory power within
a country: 39
This observation also jibes quite well with academic discussion of the domestic-foreign
distinction set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936). In that famous case, Justice Sutherland engaged in historical analysis to
conclude that the federal power over international affairs (which in the context of that case concerned international trade regulation in the form of a U.S. export embargo) descended directly to
the federal government from the British Crown, and thus was extra-constitutional. Id at 316-17.
The crux of Sutherland's analysis rested on a supposedly clear distinction between domestic matters and foreign matters-much in the same way that the assumption that international trade is a
national concern rests on international trade being distinguishable from local concerns. Sutherland's analysis in Curtiss-Wright has been seriously questioned but has not been officially overruled. See, e.g., David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19, 25 (David Gray Adler &
Larry N. George eds., 1996) (characterizing Curtiss-Wright's legacy as "powerful, albeit unfortunate"); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts,ForeignAffairs, andFederalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 1617,
1660 n.184 (1997); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1973); Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of
ExtraconstitutionalForeign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 379, 381 (2000). But see
Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1127
(1999).
The great irony of Curtiss-Wright is that even its seemingly bright-line distinction between domestic and foreign matters was not really that bright-line at all: the export sale in question was a
sale by a domestic U.S. party, Curtiss Wright Export Corp. How the Court characterized that
transaction (domestic or foreign) essentially affected the outcome of the case. Cf Jack Goldsmith,
Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 175 (2000) (discussing how characterization of issues as state law matters (e.g., family law) versus federal law (e.g., immigration) affects what law applies and the outcome of the case); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 675
(1998) ("Conventional wisdom tells us that [the United States'] federal structure is irrelevant to
the national Government's exercise of its foreign relations powers.").
3
That is, if this dichotomy is fully false, a country has three choices regarding the allocation
of this power-whereas if the dichotomy is partly false, these three choices apply to those areas of
governance for which a domestic-versus-international distinction cannot be made.
3
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* Under the first option, all international trade-related matters
are considered national matters, and the deeper penetration of
international trade into the daily lives of local residents acts to
constrain or eliminate subnational government power over international trade matters--even when the effect of international
trade is felt locally (which, I believe, it almost always is).
* Under the second option, all international trade matters are
considered local matters, a result that acts to significantly constrain federal government power to regulate international trade
in a coherent way.
* Under the third option, power over international trade matters is shared between federal and subnational governments,
and thus some measure of consensus is required to regulate international trade. Such a need for consensus might give subnational units more power over international trade activities that
affect them, but also might constrain national regulation of international trade in significant ways.
The first two options do look very much like the first two methods considered
above for factually taxonomizing "national level" versus "local level" activity.
That is because they indeed are similar. The point made here is that even if we
cannot draw clear factual distinctions between "national level" activity and "local level" activity, these approaches could be used as policy choices for allocating the international trade regulatory power between the federal and subnational
levels.
This sort of thinking about international trade and federalism is not
merely a hypothetical thought exercise: it is what countries with federal systems of government must do-whether they do it intentionally or not. In fact, it
is exactly what the United States and Canada have done, and their respective
answers about balancing federalism and international trade regulation have led
them down quite different paths. In fact, as discussed in Part IV of this Article,
U.S. federalism has trended toward the first approach (international trade as a
national matter), and Canadian federalism has trended toward the third approach
(power sharing). These paths were not foreordained, however-and the great
irony of modern U.S. and Canadian international trade regulation is that both
countries have developed international trade regulatory regimes that are significantly at odds with their original constitutional structures.
IV. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF CANADIAN AND U.S. FEDERALISM
As the following discussion illustrates, Canadian provinces have significantly more legal authority in international trade regulatory matters than their
U.S. state counterparts. In the United States, the U.S. Constitution places re-
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sponsibility for the regulation of foreign commerce, and in fact a greater comparative degree of regulatory control over domestic commerce, in the hands of
the U.S. federal government. In contrast, under the Canadian constitution the
Canadian provinces retain authority over "intra-provincial" matters, even when
those intra-provincial matters affect or pertain to international trade.
The result is that U.S. states are far less directly involved than the Canadian provinces in the development of national policies and federal laws concerning international trade. This result is more than a little ironic. The U.S. federal system was originally intended to establish a relatively more powerful government than existed under the Articles of Confederation, but state power was
still meant to be protected against federal encroachment. 4 0 By contrast, the
founders of the Canadian federal system sought to create a federal government
that was stronger than that in the United States. That nearly the exact opposite
result has come to pass has important implications for international trade regulation in the United States and Canada.
A.

U.S. Federalism
1.

U.S. Constitutional Structure Generally

Various provisions in the U.S. Constitution address the balance of power between the federal government and the states.4' Indeed, the Constitution
itself was an attempt to strengthen the national government vis Avis the states,
as compared to the more state-centric balance under the Articles of Confederation.42 The powers of the federal government are addressed in a number of provisions in the Constitution-perhaps most notably in Article VI, Clause 2 (the
Supremacy Clause), which states that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.. ..
This Article does not delve into the contentious originalism-versus-functionalism debate
that generates so much attention in the American legal academy. Rather, the basic (and I think
relatively uncontentious) point made here is that the founders were wary of overly centralized
federal power and were attempting to make their new federal government "just strong enough" to
work, but not so strong as to eviscerate state power.
41
The proper balance between federal and state power is currently the topic of intense political
and academic debate in the United States. See Gerald A. Ashdown, Federalism'sFloor, 80 Miss.
L.J. 69, 69-74 (2010) (discussing different perspectives on this balance and asserting the existence
of a "judicial leveling phenomenon" that has constrained judicial efforts to limit federal power).
42
See Arthur R. Landever, Those IndispensableArticles of Confederation-Stagein Constitutionalism, Passagefor the Framers, and Clue to the Nature of the Constitution, 31 ARIz. L. REV.
79, 90 (1989) ("[O]ne cannot deny an overriding fact of the time: the Congress essentially played
an advisory role and was at the mercy of the states for general implementation.").
U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). It is interesting to note
43
that the Articles of Confederation also contained a supremacy clause. ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII, cl. 1 ("Every State shall abide by the determination of the
4
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In addition to this general pronouncement of federal supremacy, other
provisions in the U.S. Constitution allocate, or prohibit, certain powers to the
federal government and to the states. In particular, Articles I and II delineate the
federal power in certain respects. Congress's stated powers in Article I include
the power to collect import duties," which pertain to international trade and can
be used as foreign policy tools (such as under U.S. trade remedy laws 4 5); the
power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States"; 4 6 the power "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations"; 47 the power to regulate immigration; 48
and the power to "define and punish . .. Offences against the Law of Nations"
(that is, International Law). 4 9 Article II then enumerates certain powers of the
Executive:50 Article II, Section 2 grants the president the power to make treaties
(with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate members present) and the
power to appoint ambassadors (with the advice and consent of the Senate)."
Article II, Section 3 gives the president the power to receive ambassadors,5 2
which has been interpreted to include the right to refuse to receive ambassadors,

united states in congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to
them. And the Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the
union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them;
unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed
by the legislatures of every State."). For discussion of the relationship between the Articles of the
Confederation and the Constitution, see Eric M. Freedman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and
Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confederation Period The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REv. 783, 784
(1993) and Landever, supra note 42, at 102.
4
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
45
For a discussion of U.S. trade remedy laws in a comparative context, see BOWMAN ET AL.,
supra note 17.
46
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
47
Id. cI. 3.
48

Id cl. 4.

Id cl. 10.
The vesting clause of Article I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .... ) is, textually speaking, more limited than the vesting clause
for Article 11("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."). This has been the subject of considerable discussion. See, e.g.. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 177 (1997); GARY LAWSON
49

50

& Guy

SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 46-48 (2004). It is not the purpose of this Article to get embroiled in the long-running

debate about the meaning (if any) of this difference in language. Rather, the point here is that the
foreign affairs power is largely vested in the federal government, and that many of these powers
are expressly listed in the U.S. Constitution.
5
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
52
Id. § 3.
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as well as the power to not recognize foreign governments (a formidable power
indeed).13
In stark contrast to these enumerated federal powers, Article I, Section
10 addresses what the states cannot do: states are constitutionally prohibited
from entering "into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation"; 5 4 from taxing imports or exports without congressional consent (although fees pertaining to inspections are permitted);55 and from entering into any "Agreement or Compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power" without congressional consent.
The qualifying language "without the Consent of Congress" in Clauses 2 and 3
is significant, in that it recognizes that states might play a role in the regulation
of international trade, but only in a subsidiary role. U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence further points to federal supremacy as a key purpose underlying the
Compact Clause: in Virginia v. Tennessee,57 in which the Supreme Court introduced implicit congressional consent into the State Compact equation, the Court
concluded that congressional consent was only required for compacts that might
"encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States."
The broad counterpoint to these federal restrictions on state power is the
Tenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." 59 Numerous scholars have debated the
meaning of this rather cryptic amendment,60 which textually can be read as a
5
See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1937). For further discussion, see David Gray Adler, The
President'sRecognition Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 133, 133-34 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996).
54
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
ss
Id. cl. 2.
56
Id. cl. 3.
57
148 U.S. 503 (1893).

Id. at 519.
Whether implicit congressional approval is possible remains a somewhat open question. The U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Tennessee applied implicit consent reasoning to an interstate compact. Most commentators have assumed the same logic applies to state compacts that
cross national boundaries, but there is room for debate. See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the
Compact Clause, 88 TEx. L. REv. 741, 761-96 (2010) (discussing the debate and arguing that
foreign state compacts should be analyzed differently than interstate compacts for implicit consent
purposes); Sonya F. Palay, Comment, Muddy Waters: Congressional Consent and the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 73436 (2009) (arguing that the Great Lakes Compact, which concerns trans-boundary matters, has
been implicitly consented to by Congress via legislation).
59
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
6
Compare Akhil Amar, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1199-1201
(1991) (presenting an integrated analysis of the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights), with William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, OriginalMeaning, and the
Case ofAmar's Bill ofRights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 487 (2007) (disputing Amar's textual interpreta58
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broad savings clause in favor of state power. In recent history, of course, it has
not worked quite that way: Supreme Court jurisprudence since the 1930s has
substantially expanded the power "delegated to the United States" and concomitantly reduced the powers reserved to the states.6 1 Even without this broad expansion, however, the Constitution's express delegation of the foreign relations
power to the federal government, combined with the prohibitions against state
involvement in foreign affairs, strongly indicates that the foreign affairs power
(and thus the power to regulate international trade) rests at the federal level.62
The possibility that the federal government might exercise its foreign affairs
power via treaty, even beyond Congress's legislative powers, further underscores this view. 63
All in all, then, the U.S. Constitution clearly envisages an allocation of
certain powers to the federal government and certain other powers to the states,
and it envisages the power to regulate international trade as resting largely at the
federal level. Stated differently, the Constitution establishes a division of powers between the federal and state levels. How the line should be drawn between
federallinternational concerns and state concerns heavily depends on preemption
doctrine, which is discussed below.

tion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments). See also Kurt L. Lash, James Madison's Celebrated
Report of 1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 165, 16769 (2006) (discussing the historical and current interpretations of the Tenth Amendment as a
constraint on federal power); Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in
ConstitutionalContext, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 469 (2008).
61
See generally BORIS 1. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE § 5.01 (1999).
62
See id. § 10.02 (discussing Congress's broad powers to regulate foreign commerce and the
Supreme Court's pronouncements in support of that power). See also HENKIN, supra note 14, at
66 (positing that the foreign commerce power "might be sufficient to support virtually any legislation that relates to foreign intercourse, i.e., to foreign relations"); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, I TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.2 (4th ed. 2007)
("The Constitution as originally framed seems ... to recognize a virtually unlimited power of
Congress over commerce with foreign nations.").
63
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). For discussion of an alternative interpretation
of the treaty power, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 50, at 5 (arguing that the treaty power
"does not give the national government jurisdiction beyond its other enumerated powers"), and
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 1 (2006).
It is worth noting that in Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant did have standing to challenge her conviction under a federal statute
implementing an Article H1chemical weapons treaty, on the basis that Congress had exceeded its
authority under that statute in violation of the Tenth Amendment. While the issue of standing in
that case hinged somewhat on whether the state in question had opposed the federal action (it had
not), it is nonetheless interesting that a statute implementing a ratified treaty might be considered
to fall within the scope of the Tenth Amendment-that is, perhaps outside the powers of Congress-in contravention to Missouri v. Holland, which also concerned legislation enacted by
Congress to implement a ratified treaty. See Holland,252 U.S. at 430-31.
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Preemption Generally

Under the U.S. Constitution, states have an inherent right to regulate
their "internal commerce," but they have no power to regulate interstate or foreign commerce where such regulation would amount to "a direct and substantial
interference" with federal law.64 With respect to foreign affairs, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. . . . [and, for example,] cannot negotiate . .. [a] trea-

ty with China or India.""
Federal preemption of state law can take various forms, and the case
law on preemption is not exactly a model of clarity. Over time, however, a taxonomy of federal preemption has been developed that includes several primary
types of federal preemption: "express" preemption, under which a federal law
expressly overrides state law; "field" preemption, under which the federal government's "clear and manifest intent" results in its "occupy[ing] the field" to the
exclusion of state law; "conflict" preemption, under which a state law is
preempted if compliance with it would require violation of the (preempting)
federal law; and "obstacle" preemption, under which federal law preempts state
law because the state law stands in the way of the "full objectives and purposes
of Congress."6 These types of federal preemption can occur not only via federal
statute, but also through federal regulations that implement these federal statutes-an outcome that is a logical effect of Congress's broad powers of delegation under the non-delegation doctrine.67 Presidential Executive Agreements
(which are common in U.S. international trade regulatory activity) also can be
the basis for federal preemption of state law, both on the basis of congressional
delegations of authority to the president and as an exercise of the president's
own Article II executive powers.6 8
With respect to the Foreign Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution), that clause has been interpreted to include "dormant"
restrictions on state law, in generally the same manner as the dormant Commerce Clause-that is, "self-executing limitations" that prevent state action,
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (quoting California v.
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989)). Justice Souter's opinion in Crosby actually misquotes the
Court's ARC America Corp. opinion, which uses the exact phrase "occupy a given field," but the
error does not change the meaning of the language. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372.
65
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (statement made in the context of climate
change litigation and emissions control).
6
For a more detailed summary of the types of preemption and relevant case law, see William
Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 TULSA L. REv.
1233, 1234 (2010); Jeremy Lawrence, The Western Climate Initiative: Cross-BorderCollaboration and Constitutional Structure in the United States and Canada, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225,
1246-49 (2009).
67
See Funk, supra note 66, at 1234.
68
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401, 408-10 (2003); Zschernig v. Miller, 389
6

U.S. 429 (1968).
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even absent any direct action by Congress.6 9 The preemptive scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause is arguably even broader than its domestic counterpart,
because when a commercial activity has a foreign dimension to it, this may effectively pull the activity into the category of "foreign commerce," regardless of
how much domestic (or indeed intrastate) impact the activity may have. The
same is not as clearly true for domestic commerce governed by the Commerce
Clause; in fact, recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence has more narrowly
interpreted what qualifies as domestic "interstate commerce" under the Commerce Clause.7o
3.

Preemption, Foreign Commerce, and Foreign Affairs

When the aforementioned statement regarding state surrender of sovereignty over foreign affairs7 ' is combined with the expansive nature of the Foreign Commerce Clause, as well as with concern over foreign affairs (and remember that I am classifying international trade regulation as a subset of foreign
affairs), it becomes clear that in the United States, power over foreign policy
and foreign commerce-related matters is heavily weighted in favor of the federal
government.
Perhaps the zenith of federal preemptive power in foreign affairs was
Zschernig v. Miller,72 which was decided at the height of the Cold War. In that
case, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oregon state law that prohibited
non-resident aliens from inheriting property unless certain conditions were satisfied-including that the inheritance would not be subject to confiscation
abroad. That Oregon statute was clearly aimed at restricting inheritance by
residents of Communist countries (the non-resident aliens in question were East
German citizens). The Court concluded that because the statute in question "affect[ed] international relations in a persistent and subtle way" and directly affected U.S. foreign relations,74 it was preempted.
Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, InternationalDecisions: Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 751 (2000).
70
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the federal Violence
Against Women Act civil remedy provisions on Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the federal Gun-Free Zones
Act, which criminalized firearm possession in school zones, on Commerce Clause grounds). For
general discussion, see Lash, supra note 60, at 165-75 (concerning the Rehnquist Court's "Federalism Revolution" and the Tenth Amendment) and Garrick B. Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists,
89 TEX. L. REv. 1365, 1388-90 (2011) (reviewing ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC
FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009)) (discussing Commerce
Clause jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court).
71
See supratext accompanying note 61.
72
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
7
Id. at 431-32 (majority opinion).
74
Idat4041
69
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An interesting aspect of Zschernig is that the U.S. Department of State
asserted that the Oregon statute in question did not interfere with U.S. foreign
policy, and yet the Supreme Court still concluded otherwise on the basis of
broad foreign policy considerations. In other words, the Court exercised the
power to make this determination, and did not leave that foreign policy determination to the Executive Branch. In other words, Zschernig was decided on the
basis of constitutional structure, i.e., on the basis of federal supremacy in foreign relations and policy, even in the absence of any express federal action to
the contrary.n
In the years following Zschernig, that decision came to be regarded as a
relic of its time. Louis Henkin characterized Zschernig as "a unique statement"
and "a judicial reaction to a state's contribution to the Cold War,"78 and in the
ensuing years the Court appeared increasingly reluctant to invoke Zschernig's
dormant foreign affairs preemption reasoning. In fact, a key feature of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council80 in
Id. at 432. See also id at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (characterizing the state law as improperly "launch[ing] the State upon a prohibited voyage into a domain of exclusively federal
competence").
76
Specifically, the Zschernig Court noted that "[i]n its brief amicus curiae, the Department of
Justice states that: 'The government does not . . . contend that the application of the Oregon escheat statute in the circumstances of this case unduly interferes with the United States' conduct of
foreign relations."' Id. at 434 (majority opinion). However, the Zschernig Court also concluded
that "[it seems inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon enforces affects international
relations in a persistent and subtle way... . The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must give way if they impair the
effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy.... [E]ven in absence of a treaty, a State's policy
may disturb foreign relations." Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted).
75

For further discussion of this case, see HENKIN, supra note 14, at 56-59, 163, and Harold G.
Maeier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 126, 129-30 (Louis Henkin, Michael L. Glannon & William D. Rogers eds., 1990).
7
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Zschernig, however, did rest on such reasoning: Justice
Harlan asserted that the state law in question was preempted by a 1923 federal treaty with Germany and that a broader, foreign affairs-based approach was not necessary. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at
442-44 (Harlan, J. concurring).
78
HENKIN, supra note 14, at 165.
7
Jack Goldsmith, Statutory ForeignAffairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 175, 211 (2000).
80
530 U.S. 363 (2000). In Crosby, the Court found that the state of Massachusetts' Burma
statute ran afoul of the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause in three ways. First, the act interfered with the authority delegated by Congress to the president to decide on the implementation
and scope of sanctions against Burma. Id at 376. Second, the act interfered with Congress's decision to limit economic sanctions against Burma's government to a relatively narrow range of
options. Id at 378-81. Specifically, the federal sanctions against Burma were primarily to be
limited to new investment activities, whereas the Massachusetts act imposed a secondary boycott
on a wider range of activity (that is, a boycott not just directly on Burma, but also on companies
doing business with Burma). Third, the act was "at odds with the President's intended authority to
speak for the United States among the world's nations in developing a 'multilateral strategy to
bring democracy to and improve human rights practices and the quality of life in Burma."' Id. at
380.
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2000 was the narrowness of the Court's holding: the Crosby decision was based
on a conflict preemption rationale, as opposed to following the broader preemption analyses of the lower courts in that case.8 ' Given that Crosby concerned a
Massachusetts state law that crossed into international trade sanctions territory-the law in question imposed trade sanctions on Burma (now Myanmar)-it
is quite notable that the Court consciously struck such a narrow pose. More recently, in American InsuranceAssociation v. Garamendi,82 the Court also suggested that "[statutory] field preemption might be the appropriate [preemption]
doctrine" to apply in foreign affairs cases.
Despite this trend, broad foreign affairs preemption is by no means
dead. It was, for example, discussed and relied on by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena. 4 In that case, a California statute provided a state cause of action for persons seeking recovery of Holocaust-era artwork stolen by the Nazis and currently in the possession of museums and galleries. Despite the laudable goal of that
statute-there certainly was no federal statute or regulation directly in favor of
precluding claims for stolen Nazi goods-the Ninth Circuit held the statute unconstitutional on foreign affairs preemption grounds. Citing Zschernig and the
Ninth Circuit's 2003 decision in Deutsch v. Turner Corp.,s85 the Von Saher court
stated that "[i]n the absence of some specific action that constitutes authorization on the part of the federal government, states are prohibited from exercising
foreign affairs powers."
U.S. jurisprudence on preemption and foreign affairs thus shows that
the U.S. federal preemption power is substantial, although not limitless, and that
a central issue is whether the foreign affairs power is implicated. Moreover,
For general discussion of secondary boycotts in international trade, see U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, EFFECTS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL ON U.S. BUSINESSES 1011 (1994) and Jeffrey A. Mayer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
905, 905 (2009).
81
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) (foreign affairs
preemption); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). For general
discussion of these cases, see Denning & McCall, supra note 69, at 750.
82
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
Id. at 420 n. 11 ("If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with
no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field preemption might be the
appropriate doctrine, whether the National Government had acted and, if it had, without reference
to the degree of any conflict, the principle having been established that the Constitution entrusts
foreign policy exclusively to the National Government.").
8
592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011).
85
324 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 2003).
86
Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 963-64.
87
See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's intended abrogation of state immunity from suit exceeded
congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding that certain Washington state legislation and
administrative regulations concerning the management of offshore oil spills were preempted by
8
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while most of the time preemption has been found (and likely will continue to
be found) where a state law is in conflict with a particular federal law or action,
the possibility does remain that a state law will be preempted on raw federal
foreign affairs power grounds, as was the case in Zschernig.
4.

Implications for U.S. International Trade Regulation

There are several basic international trade regulation consequences that
follow from the current state of U.S. federal preemption doctrine. First, U.S.
state activities that directly or indirectly affect U.S. international trade likely
will be preempted if they infringe on matters of significant federal concern. The
converse is also true: state activities that affect international trade nonetheless
may be permitted (or at least not be objected to), provided that these state activities are not seen as infringing on or conflicting with matters of significant federal concern." In other words, state activity that is considered ancillaryto federal
concerns might be permitted, even if the state activity seemingly is in direct
contravention of federal power, but state activity that centrally affects federal
concerns generally will not be permitted, even if the activity is seemingly far
removed from international trade regulation per se.
For example, U.S. states do engage regularly in activities that directly
concern and affect international trade-such as trade missions89 and transborder agreements of various types. As discussed above, under the Compact
Clause, states may not enter into compacts with foreign powers without the consent of Congress-and yet despite this prohibition, some trans-border agreements or compacts entered into by states have not received express congressional consent. 90 The point is that these overt trans-border state activities have not
raised significant federal concern or ire, and in some cases may be considered to
have received implicit congressional consent.9 1 By contrast, some U.S. state
laws that have only indirectly pertained to international trade regulation have
been found to infringe impermissibly upon the foreign policy power of the U.S.
government-and efforts by U.S. states to directly influence the course and

federal laws and regulations on the same subject, essentially because Congress has occupied the
field); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding, inter alia, that the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which established a federal civil cause of
action for gender-motivated violence, unconstitutionally exceeded Congress's authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause, because the regulated activity was neither economic nor interstate activity). For general discussion, see Denning & McCall, supra note 69, at 753-55.
88
Denning & McCall, supra note 69, at 751. Henkin makes the same basic point in the narrower context of state compacts. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 155.
89
Hollis, supra note 58, at 749.
90
See id. at 761; Palay, supra note 58, at 734-36 (concerning implicit congressional approval
of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact).
91
See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
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scope of U.S. national policies and federal laws concerning international trade
regulation have been generally unsuccessful. 9 2
The second consequence is that the federal government generally possesses the power to preempt state action if it so chooses. That is, the power to
decide what is ancillary to foreign affairs and what is not ultimately rests somewhere within the federal government-either with Congress via statute; with the
Executive Branch pursuant to constitutional authority delegated to the executive
by Congress or executive action pursuant to the Constitution; with the Judicial
Branch via litigation; 93 or with the president and Senate via treaty.94 In the case
of questions of preemption resolved by the judicial branch via litigation, it is
also possible that the trump card of federal legislation could be used to overcome the result (at least prospectively) if Congress does not like the litigated
outcome.95
The third consequence follows from the first two, and it is central to a
comparative analysis of U.S. federalism to Canadian federalism: despite the
aggregation of international trade regulatory power at the federal level, U.S.
states are not entirely powerless in the international trade arena. That is, while
states have little direct legal authority concerning international trade, they can
and do influence U.S. international trade regulatory activity in important ways.
State representatives in Congress are the ones responsible for drafting and passing federal international trade legislation, and because members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate are beholden to their local constituencies by
constitutional design, 96 this gives states an important means to influence U.S.
international trade regulatory activities. 97 As the old saying, goes, "all politics is
local."9 8 Largely as a result of this (and also as a matter of comity), the U.S.
federal government may consult with state governments (and state representaFor a discussion of the possibility of greater state and regional involvement in U.S. international policy development (albeit in the realm of human rights, not trade), see Catherine Powell,
Dialogic Federalism: ConstitutionalPossibilitiesfor Incorporationof Human Rights Law in the
United States, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (2001).
93
See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), affd, 641
F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011); United States v. Alabama, 813 F.
Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011); Hispanic Interest Coal. of Alabama v. Bentley, No. 5:11 -CV02484-SLB, 2011 WL 5516953 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011).
94
See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003).
9
Indeed, this approach could be used both when Congress wants federal power to preempt
state power and, conversely, when Congress wants state power to not be preempted.
96
See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
9
One might even suggest that the aggregation of power at the federal level has contributed to
the contentiousness of the current political climate in the United States and the move by the political right to reduce the size of the federal government and enhance state power: if there are few
other official avenues for states to express displeasure or oppose federal government actions, then
the avenue of congressional debate and decision-making will take on a centrally important role.
9
Tip O'NEIL, ALL POLITICS Is LOCAL AND OTHER RULES OF THE GAME, at xv (1993).
92
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tives in Congress) when considering particular actions and developing particular
policies, and the federal government may take state interests and concerns into
consideration.99
This third consequence notwithstanding, the fact remains that U.S.
states have severely limited legal power to regulate U.S. international trade. As
the following discussion illustrates, this stands in significant contrast to the legal
powers of Canadian provinces that pertain to the regulation of international
trade.
B.

CanadianFederalism
1.

Overview

Canadian federalism is markedly different from U.S. federalism. Canada of course has a parliamentary system of government, and there is also the fact
that Canada did not have an original "constitutional moment" like the United
States did. Instead, the creation of an independent Canadian federation was a far
more gradual process, and in fact Canada did not obtain full independence from
Great Britain until 1982.100
As a result of this and other factors discussed below, in Canada the
scope of the federal government's international trade regulatory powers is quite
different than in the United States. In addition, the degree of Canadian provincial power generally has trended in the opposite direction as compared to U.S.
state power. That is, while the Canadian federal government exercises primary
authority over foreign affairs' 0 and interprovincial affairs, the Canadian provinces exercise significant authority in the realm of intraprovincial affairs, including when those intraprovincial affairs pertain to foreign affairs matters. Moreover, whereas the United States' constitutional structure has evolved from a federal system of fairly disparate states into a more deeply integrated economic and
political whole, Canada's federal system has transformed from one with greater
centralized federal power-even sometimes described as "quasi-federal"102
The federal government also may fortuitously take actions that comport with state desires.
While that itself would not be dialogue, it would preclude contentious state-federal dialogue on
the matter in question-which, in effect, would amount to tacit state consent with and support for
these federal actions.
100 For general discussion of Canada's path to independence, see Watts, supra note 15, and
Wroth, supra note 15. See also Richard S. Kay, Canada'sConstitutionalCul de Sac, 35 AM. REV.
99

CAN. STUD.

705 (2005) (reviewing PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN

CANADIANS BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (3d ed. 2004)).

1ot

In Canada, the term "external affairs" is typically used in lieu of the term "foreign affairs."
This practice arose from the fact that in the British Empire, the term "foreign affairs" was reserved
to the British Crown. DANIEL DUPRAS, CAN., LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, Iss. BP-324-E, NAFTA:
IMPLEMENTATION AND

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PROVINCES

n.3

(1993),

available at

http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp324-e.htm. For the sake of clarity, however,
this Article uses the term "foreign affairs."
102
Watts, supra note 15, at 772.
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into one in which the provinces play a more direct and vibrant role, at the expense of centralized federal power. 103
The role and power of Canadian provinces is strengthened by the fact
that "interprovincial" commerce in Canada (that over which the federal government clearly has regulatory power) is defined far less broadly than "interstate
commerce" for U.S. Commerce Clause purposes." The result is that there is a
far different delineation in Canada between what we might call "national-level
activity" (that is, interprovincial activity in Canada or interstate commerce in the
United States) and "subnational" (intraprovincial or intrastate) activity. The
demarcation of federal versus provincial authority in Canada over international
trade matters is also sharper than in the United States, and some of the powers
clearly allocated to the provinces have grown in importance since the establishment of the Canadian federation in 1867. 105 As such, it seems fair to say, at least
in broad terms, that the Canadian approach bears some resemblance to the narrower conception of interstate commerce in pre-New Deal U.S. jurisprudence,106
in the sense that it limits federal power to regulate internal provincial activity
that pertains (perhaps even significantly) to inter-provincial commerce, and that
this delineation of federal and provincial powers also applies to the regulation of
Canada'sforeign commerce. The following Part traces the evolution of this current state of affairs.
2.

Historical Considerations

The original European settlement (and governance) of Canada by both
France and Great Britain, and the resulting split between English-speaking
Protestants and French-speaking Catholics, directly and deeply influenced the
development of modern Canadian federalism. In 1840, the provinces of Upper
Canada (now southern Ontario) and Lower Canada (portions of modern-day
Qu6bec, Newfoundland, and Labrador) were combined under the Act of Union,
1840, to create a new province called the Province of Canada. 107 This new province-which like its predecessors was a colony-was formed primarily to unify
the St. Lawrence region and facilitate commercial activity.08 Cultural tensions
103
Id. at 772-73. Watts also discusses the impact of the fusion of federalism with a parliamentary form of government. Id
104
See Patrick Monahan, Canadian Federalism and its Impact on Cross-Border Trade, 27
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19, 19-20 (2001).
105
See infra text accompanying notes 149-15 1.
106
For a discussion of U.S. Supreme Court pre-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence (as
well as the New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence that followed it), see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 247-59 (3d ed. 2006).
107
Duncan McArthur, ConstitutionalHistory, 1763-1840, in IV CANADA AND ITS PROVINCES:
A HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS 421, 439 (Adam Short & Sir Arthur George Doughty eds., 1914); Watts, supra note 15, at 770-72.

108

Hodge, supra note 33, at 611; Watts, supra note 15, at 770-71.
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between the English/Protestant and French/Catholic populations, however, ultimately rendered this effort unworkable, and a new approach to Canadian governance was sought. 109 During this same time period, interest in westward expansion also grew, as did the desire to develop closer commercial ties between
the Province of Canada and the eastern Maritime Provinces. 1 o Concern also
existed about commercial and political relations with the United States: reciprocal trade relations with the United States were scheduled to (and did) cease in
1866, which raised pressures for greater Canadian commercial development;
and there was some unease about poor U.S.-British relations (as a result of the
American Civil War) and the possibility of American military aggression toward Canada."'
As a result of these disparate trends and pressures, in the 1860s, leading
Canadian leaders sought to establish a stronger and larger Canadian federal union. In 1867, that goal was achieved via the British North America Act, 1867,
which in 1982 was renamed the Constitution Act, 1867.112 For purposes of convenience, this Article refers to this statute as the "1867 Act." In addition to
providing for political union along federal lines, the 1867 Act also granted Canada limited independence from Great Britain. 1 3 It took more than a century for
Canada to attain complete and total independence: the Statute of Westminster,
1931,114 granted Canada independence over its foreign affairs, and full independence was achieved five decades later pursuant to the Constitution Act,
1982,15 which was passed in parallel by the British Parliament.116
The 1867 Act thus was the initial grant of partial sovereignty to Canada,
and it is centrally important to a discussion of Canada's regulation of international trade. Facially speaking, the 1867 Act could be read broadly as providing
the Canadian federal government with "omnibus trade power" over all Canadian
trade and commercial activity,"'7 and that may be how it was read at the out-

110

Hodge, supra note 33, at 611; Watts, supra note 15, at 770-71.
Watts, supra note 15, at 770-71.

I"

Id.

109

British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) (the Act was renamed the Constitution Act as reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no.5 (Can.)). See also Sheldon D. Pollack, Constitutional Interpretation from Two Perspectives: Canada and the United States, in
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 35, 35 (Stephen L. Newman ed.,
2004).
113
British North America Act § 3 passim.
114
Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4 (U.K.).
"
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
116
Hodge, supra note 33, at 619; see also W.J. Waluchow, Democracy and the Living Tree
Constitution, 59 DRAKE L. REv. 1001, 1016 (2011). For a succinct account of Canada's gradual
acquisition from the British Crown of control over Canadian foreign affairs, see DUPRAS, supra
note 101, at 3.
117
Monahan, supra note 104, at 19.
112
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set." 8 In fact, the drafters of the 1867 Act (and thus the architects of Canada's
governmental structure)" 9 consciously chose the approach of stronger centralized economic regulation. They did so in part to ensure that the federal government would be strong enough to withstand the centripetal cultural forces (English/Protestant versus French/Catholic) that had rendered the Province of Canada an ultimately unworkable union. These Canadian leaders were, in fact, keenly aware that the U.S. Constitution (at the time) significantly limited the scope
of U.S. federal power, and they believed that those limits had contributed to the
outbreak of the American Civil War.120 Even 150 years later, it is easy to imagine their desire to chart a different course than their continental neighbors.
Several provisions of the 1867 Act are particularly salient. First, section
132 of the 1867 Act states that "[t]he Parliament and Government of Canada
shall have all Powers necessary or Proper for performing the Obligations of
Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign
Countries."' 2 1 Essentially, this means that the federal government holds the foreign affairs power, to the exclusion of the provinces. Second, section 91 of the
1867 Act states that "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce" is a federal power held by the Parliament of Canada, and not by the provinces.1 22 Section 91
drives the point home further in its last line, which states that "any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this section shall not be
The situation has been characterized by one commentator as one in which it "is very clear
[per] the Canadian constitution . . . that international trade is a federal matter," that "[t]here was
no ambiguity about this," and that the provinces never contested that state of affairs. Carl Grenier,
States, Provinces, and Cross-BorderInternationalTrade, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 175, 175 (2000).
119
The architects of the 1867 Act were led by Sir John MacDonald, Canada's most influential
politician of that age. See E. B. BIGGAR, ANECDOTAL LIFE OF SIR JOHN MACDONALD 92 (1891); Sir
John MacDonald,1815-1891, in V EMINENT PERSONS: BIOGRAPHIES REPRINTED FROM THE TIMES
90, 93 (1896).
120
RUSSELL, supra note 100, at 23. Hodge observes that "[t]he Canadians, assessing the American system in 1864-65, were understandably distressed at what they saw as federal-state tensions
run amuck," and that in order to prevent a similar "paroxysm of state's rights, they deliberately
and expressly oriented their constitution around the center, following the New Zealand model of
executive control of provincial legislative capacity." Hodge, supra note 33, at 601. Watts similarly
notes that "a strong concentration of central powers" in a "highly centralized federation" was a
hallmark feature of the 1867 Act, and that unlike under the U.S. Constitution, in Canada all residual power was to be held by the federal government (as opposed to states or "the people" in the
United States pursuant to the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). Watts, supra note 15, at
771.
121
British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 132 (U.K).
122
Id. § 91(2). Specifically, Section 91 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
"

[I]t is hereby declared that ... the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say- . . .
2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.

Id.
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deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature [enumerated elsewhere in the act]."l 23 In other words, matters are either local in nature, or they are not, with no dual provincial-federal jurisdiction-and the power
to regulate trade and commerce is a federal power.
Third, section 92 of the 1867 Act lists the exclusive powers held by
each provincial legislature, which include, among other things, the power to
make laws concerning "Property and Civil Rights in the Province."l 24 Fourth,
section 91 of the 1867 Act reserves for the federal government all powers not
expressly granted to the provinces-the very opposite of the U.S. Constitution's
Tenth Amendment.12 5 In other words, only those powers listed in section 92 are
provincial powers; all powers not listed are federal powers. Again, the intent
was that there would not be dual provincial-federal jurisdiction-and as one
commentator has aptly described it, "The whole range of legislative powers
within the new Dominion [of Canada] was exhausted by the [scheme of sections
91 and 92]."l26

Section 91 contained a twist, however, in that it gave not only the Parliament, but also the Canadian Crown, some authority over provincial matters.
Specifically, the introduction to section 91 stated (and still states) as follows:
It shall be lawvvful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make lawsfor
the Peace, Order, andgood Government of Canada, in relation
to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this
Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces;
and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality
123
124

Id. § 91.
Id. § 92. Specifically, Section 92 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to
Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated;
that is to say- . .
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.

Id.
125

Id. § 91. Sections 91 states as follows:
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate and House of Commons, to make laws for the Peace, Order, and good
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the
Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of
the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament
of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next
hereinafter enumerated ....

Id.
W.P.M. Kennedy, The Interpretationof the British North America Act, 8
146, 148 (1942-1944).

126
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of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that
(notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative
Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated. ...

127

In other words, in addition to establishing a strong centralized government and
placing the residual powers with the federal government, the 1867 Act also allowed the British Crown to retain not insignificant authority over the provinces,128 because some provinces-most notably what is now Qudbec-had successfully pressed for this as a means to protect their provincial interests against
the new Canadian federal government.12 9
These provisions of the 1867 Act, when read in combination, point to a
clear desire for a strong federal government-but they also demonstrate a clear
desire by at least some provinces (most notably Qudbec) to protect against federal encroachment on provincial power. 130 Further, these provisions illustrate the
importance of drawing a definitional line between local matters and national
matters, and they clearly show that the line was supposed to be a clear one, not
blurry and plagued by overlapping federal and provincial power. As explained
below, however, Canadian constitutional jurisprudence has drawn this line in a
way that has led to the bifurcation of the commerce power (including the foreign commerce power) between the federal government and the provinces. This
bifurcation may not have been intended, but it is now entrenched as a key feature of Canadian federalism.
The bifurcation began in 1881, when the broad commerce power of the
Canadian federal government was narrowed by the decision of the Judicial
3 ' In that
Committee of the Privy Council in Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons."
case out of Ontario, Parsons had an insurance contract for his hardware store
with Citizens Insurance Co. When his store was damaged by fire, he sought to
collect on his policy, but the insurance company refused, citing an exclusion
clause in the contract.13 Parsons argued that the exclusion clause violated the
terms of a provincial statute (the Ontario Fire Insurance Policy Act); the insurance company argued that this was a matter of "Trade and Commerce," and thus

1867 Act § 91 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 66, at 1260; Pollack, supra note 112, at 35.
129
Lawrence, supra note 66, at 1260-61.
130
For a more detailed historical discussion concerning the 1867 Act and the political landscape of the time, including the central role of tensions between the French-speaking and Englishspeaking populations of Canada in the forging of the Canadian state and constitutional structure,
see Watts, supra note 15, passim.
131
[1880], 4 S.C.R. 215 (Can. P.C.).
132
Id. at 219-20.
127
128
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solely within the federal government's power-which meant that the provincial
statute was ultra vires.133
The Privy Council (an imperial court that served as Canada's highest
tribunal until 1949 134 -a fact that illustrates the gradual transfer of power from
the British Crown to Canada) decided in favor of Parsons. In doing so, the
Council narrowly interpreted the federal government's section 91(2) power to
regulate "Trade and Commerce," and broadly interpreted the provinces' section
92(13) powers concerning "Property and Civil Rights in the Province."135 Specifically, the Council opined that the federal power to regulate trade and commerce was limited to international trade, interprovincial trade, and trade that
affected the entire Dominion of Canada. 136 Intraprovincial trade and business
agreements were not covered and remained under the authority of the provinces. 137 To interpret section 91(2) broadly, the Council believed, would subsume
the power of the provinces within the federal power in a way not intended under
the 1867 Act.138
The narrow result in Parsons was that the particular insurance contract
at issue was considered intraprovincial commerce that was outside federal government jurisdiction. 139 The broader (and more important) effect, however, was
that the trade and commerce power in Canada became bifurcated between the
federal government and the respective provincial governments-and the federal
government's power to regulate trade and commerce did not extend to matters
within the provinces. Given the size and economic activity of the larger CanadiId.
134
Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act, S.C. 1949, c.37, § 3 (Can.). See also Jamal Greene,
On the Origins of Originalism,88 TEX. L. REv. 1, 21 (2009). For general discussion of the historical role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Canada, see Raphael Tuck, Canadaand
the JudicialCommittee of the Privy Council, 4 U. TORONTO L.J. 33 (1941).
135
Parsons,4 S.C.R. at 227-32.
136
Id
'

137
138

Id
Specifically, the Council stated:

The words "regulation of trade and commerce," in their unlimited sense are
sufficiently wide, if uncontrolled by the context and other parts of the Act, to
include every regulation of trade ranging from political arrangements in regard to trade with foreign governments, requiring the sanction of parliament,
down to minute rules for regulating particular trades. But a consideration of
the Act shows that the words were not used in this unlimited sense. In the first
place the collocation of [Section 91(2)] with classes of subjects of national
and general concern [in Section 91] affords an indication that regulations relating to general trade and commerce were in the mind of the legislature, when
conferring the power on the dominion Parliament. If the words had been intended to have the full scope of which in their literal meaning they are susceptible, the specific mention of several of the other classes of subjects enumerated in sect. 91 would have been unnecessary ....
Id at 257.
139

Id
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an provinces-in 2008, Ontario alone accounted for nearly 37% of Canadian
GDP, and Qu6bec accounted for nearly 19%l'4 0 -this was a significant development indeed. Parsonscontinues to be the leading case on point, and it is regularly cited for this proposition of Canadian constitutional law. 14 1
A little more than 50 years later, in 1937, the Privy Council further constrained Canadian federal power in the Labour Conventions case. 142 In that
case-also out of Ontario-the Canadian federal government had signed international labour conventions that pertained to, among other things, working
hours, time off, and minimum wages for workers. In Canada, as in the United
Kingdom, treaties are not self-executing,143 which means that any international
agreement entered into by Canada must be implemented into Canadian domestic
law by statute. The government of Canada sought to implement Canada's obligations under the treaty via federal legislation, and Ontario objected.
In deciding in favor of Ontario, the Privy Council stated that while the
power to conclude treaties and other international agreements squarely rests
with the federal government, the implementation of treaties into Canadian law
must comport with the constitutional divisions of power between the federal
government and provinces.'" Specifically, the Privy Council ruled that although
the Statute of Westminster (1931) had granted Canada full power over Canadian
foreign affairs, the Canadian federal government nonetheless could not infringe
upon the provinces' intraprovincial powers (under section 92 of the 1867 Act) in
implementing treaty obligations. Writing for the Privy Council, Lord Atkin described this division of power between the Canadian federal government and the
provinces as a system of "watertight compartments." 4 5 This view has been
roundly condemned,14 6 but the Labour Conventions decision was and remains
good lawl 47-although it is true that Canadian courts since the 1960s have
seemed more willing to permit some "necessarily incidental" federal regulation
of intraprovincial activity under schemes to regulate interprovincial or interna-

140 See Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-Based, by Province and Territory, STATISTICS
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/101/cst01/econl5-eng.htm (last visited
Apr. 8, 2012).
141
See, e.g., Hon. John D. Richard, Separation of Powers: The CanadianExperience, 47 DUQ.
L. REv. 731, 747 (2009); Greg Taylor, The Commerce Clause-Commonwealth Comparisons, 24
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 235, 239 (2001); John D. Whyte, ConstitutionalChange and ConstiCAN.,

tutionalDurability,5 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 419, 430-31 (2011).
142

A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. (Labour Conventions Case), [1937] App. Cas. 326 (Can. P.C.).

14

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, TREATY-MAKING:

EXPRESSION OF CONSENT BY STATES TO BE BOUND

BY A TREATY 93 (2001).
4

A.G. Can., App. Cas. at 326.

Id. at 354.
See, e.g., FREDERICK LEE MORTON,
427 (3d ed. 2002).
147
See Monahan, supra note 104, at 24.
1

14

LAW, POLITICS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CANADA
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tional trade,148 as well as to permit some provincial laws despite their incidental
effect on interprovincial trade. 149
The effect of the Labour Conventions decision, therefore, is that treaties
may need to be implemented in parallel by both the Canadian federal government and various provincial governments-at least to the extent that they concern both intraprovincial and federal-level matters. 5 o Labour Conventions also
means that provinces can effectively refuse to cooperate with the implementation of federal treaties-something that sounds astonishing to American readers-and that to the extent a treaty has intraprovincial effects, the federal government likely will need to seek consensus and cooperation from the various
Canadian provinces.
A high profile example of this bifurcated implementation approach is
NAFTA, aspects of which the provinces had to implement into provincial law in
order for NAFTA to be executed in Canada."' In contrast, while there were
serious objections in the United States to NAFTA, including at least one constitutional challenge,1 52 the constitutional argument against NAFTA in the United
States was that NAFTA was implemented via federal legislation (i.e., as a congressional-executive agreement), rather than as an Article II treaty. No serious
arguments were made that U.S. states did not have to abide by the NAFTA Implementation Act 53 because of intrastate effects.

148
See R. v. Klassen, [1959], 20 D.L.R. 2d 406 (Can. Man. C. A.) (upholding application of the
federal Canadian Wheat Board Act to intraprovincial transactions); Caloil, Inc. v. A.G. Can.,
[1971] S.C.R. 543 (Can.)) (upholding the validity of federal restrictions on intraprovincial distribution of imported petroleum products). See also Labatt Breweries of Can., Ltd. v. A.G. Can.,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 914 (Can.) (addressing federal authority over "general regulation of trade").
149
Carnation Co. v. Quebec Agric. Mktg. Bd. [1968] S.C.R. 238, 254 (Can.) ("In the present
case, the orders under question were not ... directed at the regulation of interprovincial trade....
The most that can be said of them is that they had some effect upon the cost of doing business in
Qudbec of a company engaged in interprovincial trade, and that, by itself, is not sufficient to make
them invalid.").
150
See William Tetley, CanadianInterpretationand Construction of Maritime Conventions, 23
R.G.D. 109, 109-28 (1991), available at http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/maritimeadmiralty/interpretation.
151
Id. Canada has entered into a number of other free trade agreements in recent years. See
Negotiations
and
Agreements,
FOREIGN
AFF.
&
INT'L
TRADE
CAN.,
(last
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx
visited Apr. 4, 2012). It is standard practice of the Canadian federal government to consult with
the provinces concerning international trade agreements, so as to avoid situations in which the
federal government has made commitments it cannot honor-which would be both damaging to
the federal government's reputation and perhaps a breach of Canada's international legal obligations. See DUPRAS, supra note 101, at 4; see also infra text accompanying note 170.
152
See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1317-23 (N.D. Ala.
1999), vacated, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).
15
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat.
2057 (1993).
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A more recent example of the impact of Labour Conventions is the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in Thomson v. Thomson,1 54 which concerned a
transnational child custody dispute. In Thomson, a young Scottish couple had an
infant son."' After their marriage collapsed, the mother gained interim custody
of the child and took the child with her to Manitoba, Canada, to visit her emigrant parents.1 56 Once there, she decided that she (and her son) should stay there
permanently.'"' Her actions clearly violated the Scottish court's orders (issued
before her departure from Scotland) that the father have interim access to the
child and that the child remain in Scotland pending further proceedings.'5 8 Her
actions also violated the terms of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 59 which had been signed and ratified by the Canadian federal government.160 Further hearings in Scotland resulted in the father
being awarded custody of the child, and he sought the child's return.161
The Hague Convention in question had been implemented into Manitoban law by provincial legislation, but that provincial legislation actually expanded on the provisions of the Convention so as to promote the best interests
of the child.162 In other words, it was consistent with the Convention, but went
further in certain respects. The Court, therefore, had to determine whether the
case should be resolved on the basis of the Convention itself, or instead on the
basis of provincial law implementing the Convention in Manitoba. In holding
that Manitoban law applied, the Court relied directly on the Labour Conventions
case, explaining that while the Canadian federal government exercised "exclusive treaty-making powers," the power "[was], nonetheless, limited by the constitutional division of powers" in Canada, and that per the Labour Conventions
case, "'the obligations imposed by treaty may have to be performed, if at all, by
several [provincial] [l]egislatures."" 63 The child was therefore ordered returned
to Scotland in accordance with Manitoban law.'6 While the same result (return
of the child to Scotland) most likely would have been reached under the Con154

[1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 (Can.).

155

Id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 605.

156
1

ss

1983 Can. T.S. No. 35.
Thomson, 3 S.C.R at 576 (quoting PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 283
(3d ed. 1992) & A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. (Labour Conventions Case), [1937] App. Cas. 326 (Can.
P.C.)).
161
Id. at 56 1.
162
Id. at 556.
163
Id. at 611 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J.) (quoting A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. (Labour Conventions
Case), [1937] App. Cas. 326, 348 (Can. P.C.)).
16
Id. at 605. It is worth noting that the same basic result would have been reached under the
Convention. Id.
5

160
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vention, the point here is that even when the result was the same, and even
though international child abduction can be characterized (without too much
effort) as international in nature, Manitoban law was still applied under a Labour Conventions analysis.
3.

Recent Developments

This dual role of the Canadian federal government and provincial governments has taken on greater importance in recent decades, as Canadian federal
and provincial views of international trade have begun to diverge in certain respects. In the early years of post-World War II trade liberalization (up to the
early 1970s), the Canadian provinces and Canadian federal government were all
generally in favor of GATT efforts to liberalize international trade, and in any
event the early GATT efforts focused on tariff reductions, which were clearly a
federal matter.'65 In Canada, the result was that provincial non-involvement
essentially amounted to provincial consent.166
With the Tokyo Round of GATT in the 1970s, however, multilateral
trade liberalization efforts began to address more difficult topics such as nontariff barriers,167 and no longer were the Canadian provinces necessarily in favor
of all trade liberalization efforts supported by the Canadian federal government. 8 It is important to note that this Canadian provincial concern grew over
the same time period that GATT and WTO trade liberalization efforts themselves became more contentious and drawn-out. Thus, the declining consensus
among Canadian provinces regarding international trade liberalization generally
coincided with the declining consensus on the same topic at the international
level. Since the 1970s, then, Canadian provincial governments have become
more active participants in Canadian international trade regulation,16 9 and this
has had a constraining effect on the Canadian federal government in the field of
international trade regulation
In recognition of these limitations on federal power, and as a means to
facilitate internal consensus on Canadian international trade policy, the Canadian federal government has established various committees, such as the Joint
Working Group on International Trade and the Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Committee on Trade ("C-Trade"), which are tasked with soliciting and receiving
input on trade policy matters from various constituencies, including the provinces, territories, municipalities, companies, trade associations, and NGOs. "' The165
16
167
168

See Grenier,supra note 118, at 175-76; Schaefer, Pareto Gains,supra note 9, at 450-51.
Grenier, supra note 118, at 176.
Schaefer, ParetoGains, supra note 9, at 450-51.
Grenier, supra note 118, at 179-80.

169

Id.
See InternationalAgreements and Local Government: A Guide for CanadianMunicipalities; Annex A: Canada's Free Trade Agreements: An Overview, FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE
170
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se mechanisms have been established not just to encourage consensus: they have
been established because the Canadian provinces play a key legal role in the
development of Canadian trade policy, and their role cannot be bypassed.'
4.

Implications for Canadian International Trade Regulation

The results regarding Canadian international trade regulation-and the
important points for purposes of this Article-are the following. First, Canadian
provinces, unlike their U.S. state counterparts, exercise important legal power
concerning international trade regulation, to the extent that trade has
intraprovincial effects. Second, Canadian federal concerns do not trump or
preempt such provincial concerns in international trade matters, as they often do
in the United States. Stated differently, the exercise of line-drawing between
federal and state/provincial power in Canada plays out quite differently than it
does in the United States. Third, the power of Canadian provinces to regulate
international trade has, if anything, increased in the decades since the Labour
Conventions decision, both because international trade has become more important to the Canadian economy (and thus has greater intraprovincial effects),
and because there is now less consensus between the federal government and
the provinces (and between the provinces themselves) concerning what Canadian trade policy and international trade regulation should look like. Fourth, and
perhaps ironically, this expansion of Canadian provincial power has occurred
over the very same time period that U.S. state power has been eroded by the
growing regulatory power of the U.S. federal government. The situation in Canada, therefore, stands in significant contrast to the situation in the United States,
where federal preemption of state power in foreign affairs is largely presumptive.
V.

REGIONAL TRADE THEORY

The legal differences between U.S. and Canadian federalism in the area
of international trade regulation are interesting in their own right, but the application of regional trade theory to U.S. and Canadian federalism highlights important broad themes about how the federal structures of these countries affect
their regulation of international trade. This Part, therefore, briefly summarizes
relevant aspects of regional trade theory and considers the implications thereof
for U.S. and Canadian federalism.
In terms of regional trade theory, the Canadian federal union is less fully centralized-or less deeply integrated, if you will-than the U.S. federal systern, in which federal power by and large trumps subnational state power whenever it chooses. This fundamental difference holds important implications for
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/AnnexB-en.pdf.
171 See supradiscussion accompanying notes 100-170.
CAN.,
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how international trade policy and regulations are developed in the U.S. and
Canada; what conclusions are reached in each country regarding which trade
regulations and policies are desirable; and how rapidly and effectively those
decisions can be made and implemented. That, in turn, can directly affect the
ability of each country to influence the development of International Law concerning the regulation of international trade-and that, in turn, can affect how
much each country might benefit from future developments in that area of International Law. The international legal order remains predominantly unitary in
nature, with countries (and some international organizations) as the recognized
actors1 72-and because of this, the national process for developing and promulgating international trade regulations and policy can greatly affect (for good or
for ill) the ability of a country to have a meaningful voice in the development of
the international legal system's rules for international trade. 7 3 This is a matter
of considerable significance for the United States and Canada, given that the
U.S. economy is increasingly based on international trade, and that international
trade represents a substantial majority of Canadian GDP.174 Furthermore, embedded in all of this are considerations of due process and democratic governance, and whether a more centralized approach to international trade regulation-one in which the federal government is less obliged to take subnational
concerns into account-might subvert these principles.
A.

The Basics of Regional Trade Theory75

Preferential Trade Agreements ("PTAs")-also known as "Preferential
Trading Areas," "Regional Trade Agreements," "Regional Trade Arrangements" and other similar permutations-are preferential trading arrangements
entered into by two or more countries in the interest of promoting greater ecoSee HENKIN, supra note 14, at 150.
This point remains valid regardless of how these national decisions are made. For example,
Anne-Marie Slaughter, in her seminal work, NEW WORLD ORDER, argues (quite convincingly) that
transnational inter-governmental networks exist--so that, for example, decisions concerning the
regulation of exports and imports, or concerning the coordination or interplay of countries' corporate securities laws, are made by respective officials in different countries who are charged with
these matters and are regularly in communication with one another. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER 1-6 (2004). Through these "networks," common policies, solutions and
means of coordination are developed and implemented. Id.
172
173

That may be true, but the point here is that these national officials are responsible for carrying out
(or at least not acting inconsistent with) their countries' clearly established international trade
policies. An export control official, for example, exercises discretion within this framework, not
outside it. And to the extent that no clear national policies exist, national officials dealing with
international matters either will be hamstrung into inaction, or be free to act as they choose. Under
both scenarios, the ability of a country to advance its interests at the international level may be
impaired: through inaction in the first scenario, and through "rowing in different directions" in
the second scenario.
174
See supra Part HI.
17
Portions of this Part are excerpted, in modified form, from Bowman, supra note 26.
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nomic ties and/or achieving certain foreign policy goals.17 6 Traditional PTA
taxonomies have focused on PTAs' levels of internal economic integration and
cooperation. The taxonomies range from less integrated PTA forms, such as free
trade agreements ("FTAs") like NAFTA-which are characterized by internal
trade liberalization but no coordination of monetary policy or a common external tariff ("CET")-to more integrated forms such as customs unions with
CETs, to even more integrated common markets like the EU that feature broader
elimination of internal trade barriers, to economic unions that coordinate economic policies, and perhaps even share a single currency or tightly peg their
currencies (again, like the EU).1 7 7 The penultimate stage is complete economic
integration with monetary union, and the final stage is political union as well.'
While there are variations in the taxonomies employed by various scholars, 79
the main point is that PTA taxonomies are preferentialist and can progress from
less integrated to more integrated forms. This preferentialist view of PTAs is so
well established, in fact, that it is embodied in GATT.'80
B.

Deepening Versus Broadening

In a recent law review article, I posited "that decisions regarding PTA
formation .

.

. membership, and the sectoral scope of PTAs are, at their core,

decisions about deepening existing economic relationships versus broadening to
form new ones."' 8 Specifically, I stated that:
PTA decisions operate within a larger framework in which each
PTA decision is, ultimately, a choice between deepening a
state's existing, formal international ties to make them more fully integrative, versus broadening a state's formal international

176

See

DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE

5-7

(2009); BHALA, supranote 23, at 371, 383 (defining "Preferential Trading Agreement" or "Prefer-

ential Trading Area," as well as "Regional Trading Arrangement").
17
BtLA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961); Joel P. Trachtman, International Trade: Regionalism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 151
(Andrew T. Guzman & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 2007); Helen Wallace & Alasdair R Young, The
Single Market: A New Approach to Policy, in POLICY-MAKING INTHE EUROPEAN UNION 125 (Helen Wallace & William Wallace eds., 3d ed. 1996); PETER RoBSoN, THE ECONOMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION passim (4th ed. 1998); DENNIS R. APPLEYARD ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 393-94 (7th ed. 2010).
178
BALASSA, supra note 177, at 2; ROBSON, supra note 177, at 123-30.

"7

See, e.g., Arvind Panagariya, PreferentialTrade Liberalization: The TraditionalTheory and
New Developments, 38 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 287 (2000) (listing preferential trade arrangements,
free trade areas, and customs unions); APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 177, at 393-94.
180
See GATT, supra note 35, at art. XXIV.
181
Bowman, supra note 26, at 498.
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economic ties to include new ties that are less deep, in an inte-

grative sense.182
This distinction between deepening versus broadening at this macro-economic
level is not exactly the same thing as vertical versus horizontal integration at the
micro-economic level. Vertical integration concerns the coordination (and integration within a single entity or among related entities) of different stages of
production; horizontal integration concerns the consolidation of companies in a
single market (at the same stage of production).'
This approach helps explain important differences between European
regional integration and U.S. regional trade initiatives. A primary difference
between EU and U.S. regional trade/PTA efforts is that EU internal efforts have
been aimed at greater political and economic integration, whereas U.S. efforts
have been largely foreign policy-driven. Specifically, the overall EU trend since
the 1960s (and especially since the 1980s) embraced both coterminous deepening (of internal economic and legal integration) and broadening (to include an
ever-greater number of state participants).18 4 In contrast, the United States' approach has been far less integrative. Since 1985, when the U.S. entered into its
first FTA with Israel, nearly all U.S. PTA efforts have been bilateral PTAs,18 5
usually with small countries-often ones such as Morocco or Peru that offer
little commercial benefit to the United States. 186 The U.S. objectives for such
PTAs have been less economically integrative and more security-or foreign
policy-driven.

Id. at 498-99.
Paul J.J. Welfens & Michael Vogelsang, Concepts and Theory, in INTERNATIONALISATION
OF EUROPEAN ICT ACTIVITIES: DYNAMICS OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONs TECHNOLOGY
6, 71 (Huub Meijers et al. eds., 2008).
'
There are currently 27 EU member states. See How the EU Works, Countries, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index-en.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
185
The two exceptions are NAFTA, which is tri-lateral, and the Dominican Republic-Central
America-United Stated Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which has six member states. See
CAFTA-DR (DominicanRepublic-CentralAmerica FTA), OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-centralamerica-fta (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). A third, and quite new, initiative is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement initiative, announced by the Obama Administration in December 2009, which
has as its goal the "shaping [of] a high-standard, broad-based regional pact." Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
182

183

186

See

Morocco

Free

Trade

Agreement,

OFFICE

U.S.

TRADE

http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta
2012);

Peru

Trade

Promotion Agreement,

OFFICE

U.S.

REPRESENTATIVE,

(last visited Apr. 4,

TRADE

REPRESENTATIVE,

http//www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
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Deepening Versus Broadeningand InternationalTrade Regulation in
the United States and Canada

Viewing integration through the conceptual lens of deepening versus
broadening provides an interesting lens through which to view international
trade regulation in the United States and Canada. It suggests several points,
which are discussed below.
1.

Sovereignty, Consensus, and International Trade Regulation

It is interesting to consider how the bifurcated structure of Canadian international trade regulation has resulted in a modern governmental structure in
Canada that, regarding international trade, tends to treat provinces as separate
and somewhat independent sovereigns, rather than as fully subordinate units.
Given that discussions of regional or multilateral trade integration are brimming
with concerns over the cession of sovereignty (indeed, this is a key theme in
U.S. domestic debates over international trade policy), 18 7 the greater power of
Canadian provincial governments means that in effect, if not intent, Canadian
trade policy more closely resembles consensual negotiations among regional
trading partners than it does the top-down approach in the United States, which
reflects the supremacy of the U.S. federal government in foreign affairs. Concerted Canadian action in the international trade arena is broad and consensusbased; it is not centralized.
The power of provinces in Canadian international trade regulation, and
thus the need for consensus, is exacerbated by some non-legal factors as well.
The demographics of Canada are different than those of the United States: the
Francophone population of Qu6bec can make itself heard through Qudbec's
provincial government precisely because it is a large and concentrated popula-

187

See, e.g.,

JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 34 (1998) ("Global
governance,
then, does not threaten to replace the American government, but it does threaten to distract and
confuse and, ultimately, to weaken it."); Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy:
The Future of the World Trade Organization,2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 403, 403 (2001) ("In a world of
increasing technological and economic integration, [the United States] must continue to balance
and rebalance a defense of national sovereignty against grants of authority over economic and
social policy to international organizations such as the WTO."); Ronald A. Brand, Sovereignty:
The State, the Individual, and the InternationalLegal System in the Twenty First Century, 25
HASTINGS INT'L

&

COMP. L. REV. 279, 288-89 (2002) ("International organizations that began

primarily for purposes of economic cooperation have an impact on sovereignty because they have
evolved to levels of cooperation that affect political relationships. The best example is the European Union . . . ."); Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CH. J. INT'L L. 401, 402
(2000) ("This notion of sovereignty-sovereignty as formal control-is not seriously in doubt.
The important question is instead a subtler one: whether the development and expansion of multilateral institutions are systematically altering our customary modes of domestic law and politics.
Put differently, the question is: have we delegated away a significant part of our capacity for, and
manner of, self government in the process of international cooperation?").
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tion located in an influential province.' 88 To the extent the Francophone population has different views on the intraprovincial aspects of international trade regulation (or any other subject, for that matter), the federal structure in Canada
allows them to be heard in a muscular way. The same is not true for minority
populations in the United States that are spread across various states." That is
one reason, in fact, that civil rights advances in the United States largely took
place at the federal level, and not through the states.190
By the same token, Canadian commercial interests tend to be concentrated in Ontario and Qu6bec.191 This means that the various Canadian provinces
have different economies with different dominant economic interests-and it
also means that dominant economic actors in these provinces can work through
provincial channels to promote or protect their interests. The result is that the
provinces can play a key role in discussions about international trade policy and
other matters that have intraprovincial effects, and that progress, which requires
consensus, cannot be achieved without the involvement and agreement of the
provincial populations and key economic actors.
In important ways, then, modern Canadian national sovereignty is less
deep than modern U.S. national sovereignty. U.S. national sovereignty has
deepened far beyond what the founders envisioned when they replaced the Articles of Confederation with the U.S. Constitution, and it outstrips the depth of
Canadian sovereignty, at least in terms of international trade regulation. The
result is that Canadian international trade regulation is far more driven by, and
dependent on, consensus than U.S. activities in the area of international trade.
2.

The Effectiveness of International Trade Decision-Making

The greater provincial power in Canada bodes well for bottom-up participation of various constituencies in the formulation of Canadian international
trade regulatory policy. Rather than developing international trade regulations
and policies and obliging the provinces to abide by these federal decisions, the
Canadian federal government must obtain provincial support for any international trade regulations and policies that have an intrastate effect. As noted
above, the way to do that is to seek provincial consensus.192
Watts, supra note 15, at 778 ("In Canada, the most significant minority group, the
francophones [French-speaking Canadians] ... are particularly strongly concentrated in one province, Qu6bec. . .. They form [eighty] percent of that province's population.").
189
Id. ("A significant social difference between the United States and Canada is the degree of
territorial concentration of their most significant minority groups.. .. The result of the differing
patterns of territorial diffusion has been a differing dynamic in the processes for the protection and
maintenance of minority rights.").
'9
HENKIN, supra note 14, at 150.
191
Watts, supra note 15, at 780 ("Historically, industry and wealth have tended to be concentrated in the two large central provinces of Ontario and Quebec, particularly the former.").
02
See supra Part IV.B.
188

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

41

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 9
1048

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114

On the other hand, greater provincial power in Canada also could augur
ill for future international trade regulation in Canada. Public choice theory is
useful for tracking and predicting decision-making processes,' 93 and without
getting into too much detail here, it is apparent that any particular province's
interests could be at odds with the greater interests of Canada as a whole. The
ability of the larger provinces to effectively block changes in Canadian international trade regulation, via refusal to incorporate necessary aspects of those regulatory changes into provincial law, could mean that the current "broad" international trade regulatory structure in Canada might limit the Canadian federal
government's ability to regulate international trade effectively, and thus chart
the future course of Canadian international trade. For a country that is so highly
dependent on international trade for its economic well-being, that would be a
serious concern.1 94
To date, the Canadian approach has worked, in significant part because
of the relatively small number of Canadian provinces (compared to fifty-plus
U.S. states and territories)195 and the fact that most Canadian trade is with the
United States (which reduces the variables that need to be considered when setting international trade policies).19 6 Past success, however, does not ensure future success. Cultural tendencies can change over time (witness the decline of
consensus in modern U.S. politics), and the nature of the international trade
landscape is certain to change as well. For example, Canadian trade with countries other than the United States might increase, leading the provinces to have
more divergent international trade interests and concerns, and the Canadian predisposition for consensus might wane. Were those things to happen, Canada's
1
See, e.g., Thomas M. Murray, The US.-French Dispute Over GATT Treatment ofAudiovisual Products and the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution was
"Rent-Seeking," 21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 203, 203-05 (1997) (discussing "a Public Choice
analysis of the dispute between France and the United States regarding treatment of film and
audiovisual products under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)"); David
Quartner, Public Choice Theory, Protectionismand the Case of NAFTA, 26 EcoN. AFF., Mar.
2006, at 59 ("Public choice theory suggests that the political process has an in-built tendency to
promote protectionist measures favored by organized interest groups rather than trade liberalization that would benefit society as a whole."); Charles K. Rowley & William Thorbecke, The Role
of the Congress and the Executive in US. Trade Policy Determination:A Public Choice Analysis
in National Constitutions and International Economic Law, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIC LAW (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993); Paul B.
Stephan Ill, BarbariansInside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and InternationalEconomic Law,
10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745, 746 (1995) ("Public choice theory seeks to apply certain insights derived from the study of private economic behavior to collective action problems . . . .").
194
See supranote 11 (providing Canadian government GDP and international trade statistics).
195
See Watts, supra note 15, at 786.
196
See Trade Data Online: Canadian Trade by Industry (NAICS Codes), INDUSTRY CAN.,
http://www.ic.gc.ca/sc7mrktiltdst/tdo/tdo.php#tag (select "Canada" under "Trader," then select
"United States" under "Trading Partner," then click the "Run Report" hyperlink). The most recent
data available indicates that well over eighty percent of Canada's international trade is with the
United States.
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future ability to develop and implement viable international trade policies could
be seriously hindered. In other words, the very broadness that to date has encouraged greater provincial participation might turn into a serious weakness.
In contrast, developments akin to the hypothetical scenario just presented have taken place in the United States-namely, U.S. trade patterns are more
diversified, and in the United States' current political climate, compromise
(which is necessary to consensus) is often characterized as weakness. Despite
these developments, the U.S. federal government has been able to develop and
implement international trade policies and regulatory structures with relatively
little state interference or objection. This is due to the nature of U.S. federalism
and preemption doctrine, which means that federal power over international
trade matters extends quite deeply into state activities.
Moreover, the U.S. federal government's ability to take international
trade regulatory actions is further enhanced by the fact that U.S. international
trade regulatory matters are, with notable exceptions, less visible to the American public than other issues, such as healthcare or the federal deficit. 9 7 One
reason for this is that international trade is a less prominent feature of the U.S.
economy than of the Canadian one; 198 as a result, local and congressional politicians may not need to respond to international trade issues in order to appease
their local constituencies. Another reason is that procedural notice requirements,
which apply to much U.S. federal regulatory activity (such as under the Administrative Procedure Act)' 99 are truncated or simply do not apply to international
trade regulatory activities by the federal government, because these actions pertain to foreign affairs. 2 00 The effect is that states are presented with a fail acNotable exceptions include the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, or the current hot button
topics of immigration and offshoring. See, e.g., James Bennet, The Free Trade Accord: Auto
Workers; Anger, Fear but Also Hope on the Assembly Line, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1993, at A26;
Nicholas Confessore & Jim Ruteberg, PAC Ads Rip at Gingrich as Romney Stands Clear, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2011, at Al (discussing PAC ads addressing, inter alia, illegal immigration matters); Tyler Cowen, How Immigrants CreateMore Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at 6.
198
This is not to say it is not vitally important-it is. Rather, it is to say that international trade
makes up a smaller percentage of the U.S. economy than of the Canadian economy. See supra text
accompanying notes 28-29.
'
5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
200
See, e.g., Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; Iranian Transactions Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg.
63, 197-201 (proposed Oct. 12, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 538, 560) (stating, regarding the amendment of U.S. trade sanctions against Sudan and Iran, that "[b]ecause the amendments of [these trade sanctions programs] involve a foreign affairs function, the provisions of
Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993 [setting forth executive branch guidelines for regulatory decision-making], and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of
proposed rulemaking, opportunity for public participation, and delay in effective date are inapplicable"); Wassenaar Arrangement 2010 Plenary Agreements Implementation: Commerce Control
List, Definitions, Reports, 76 Fed. Reg. 29, 610-701 (proposed May 20, 2011) (to be codified at
15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 740, 742-43, 772, 774) ("The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(5 U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of proposed rulemaking, the opportunity for public participation,
and a delay in effective date, are inapplicable because this regulation involves a military and foreign affairs function of the United States (5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). . . . If this rulemaking was delayed
197
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compli, rather than a proposed federal action that could at least be objected to,
and perhaps opposed by the state's representatives in Congress prior to implementation.
Thus, the U.S. federal government is far less constrained than the Canadian federal government by subnational interests, and the result is that the U.S.
federal government is more able to alter its national scheme of international
trade regulation and policies. From the perspective of sheer governmental power
and flexibility in international trade regulatory matters, the deep nature of U.S.
federal government control over international trade activities within states (that
is, intrastate) gives it substantially freer rein than the Canadian federal government has in such matters.
3.

Due Process and International Trade Regulation

Finally, from the perspective of democratic governance and due process, the current Canadian approach has much appeal. It is worth noting that
some U.S. scholars have raised due process concerns over U.S. governmental
activities in the arena of international trade regulation, although these objections
have been to little avail. 201 A detailed discussion of due process (or the general
lack thereof) in the administration of U.S. international trade regulatory laws is
beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth pointing out that concerns over
detrimental reliance when trade policies suddenly shift, or concerns over the
inconsistent enforcement and predictability of U.S. international trade regulation, or concerns over favoritism to (or prejudice against) particular regions or
industries, are legitimate concerns. If U.S. federal government power over international trade matters is relatively unconstrained, and if seemingly intrastate
matters fall within the bounds of the federal power to regulate international
trade, any challenge to perceived wrongs will be an uphill battle.
A related issue is the definition of "international trade" itself (as opposed to domestic activity), and who gets to define it. As discussed above in
Part IV.A of this Article, in the United States if a matter is "international," then
the federal government generally holds the power; if it is not, then a closer federalism analysis is necessary. And while the power to define something as international or domestic does not expressly lie with the federal government, a federal agency (or the president) that has been delegated power over a particular area
to allow for notice and comment, it would . .. injure the credibility of the United States in this and
other multilateral regimes.").
201
See, e.g., Peter L. Fitzgerald, Smarter "Smart" Sanctions, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 37, 48
(2007) ("In comparison to the substantive and procedural safeguards commonly found surrounding the imposition of penalties and the deprivation of property in civil or criminal proceedings,
there is very little oversight or judicial review exercised when these same sorts of governmental
actions are styled as 'foreign policy' measures as part of a sanctions program."); Michael Wallace
Gordon, The Conflict of United States Sanctions Laws with Obligations Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1259, 1284-85 (1998) ("Perhaps of most importance is the question of due process by an action in the United States . . . .").
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of international trade would be given significant deference (such as Chevron
deference) 202 in deciding what activity is (and is not) "international" in nature.
In contrast, in Canada the question is whether there is an intraprovincial element to the commercial activity in question, regardless of whether
the activity in question is international trade-related or not.203 If there is an
intraprovincial aspect, then the provinces would have legal authority concerning
the regulation of that activity. From a due process perspective, the Canadian
approach has much to commend it, and offers far greater assurance that local
concerns will be taken into account. The larger question, as already noted above,
is what happens to Canadian international trade regulation and policy if federalprovincial consensus cannot be reached. In a system that relies on consensus, a
lack of consensus would at best result in a rigid and unchanging status quodecision by indecision-and at worst a complete breakdown of Canadian international trade regulation and policy. As with most things, the truth probably lies
somewhere in between-but it is clear that Canadian international trade regulation and policy would be seriously impaired, and Canada would be much more
at the mercy of decisions made by other countries and international organizations without meaningful Canadian involvement. For multilateral decisions that
require Canadian approval, such Canadian indecision actually might preclude
agreement and the active multilateral regulation of international trade.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The Canadian federal system is characterized by greater decentralization
than the U.S. federal system, especially in the arena of international trade, and
over the past fifty or sixty years the two countries in fact have been trending in
opposite directions regarding the regulation of international trade-with the
U.S. becoming more centralized, and Canada less so. In regional trade theory
terminology, Canadian integration in international trade regulation is becoming
less deep, and U.S. integration has become more deep. Canada's trend may well
be exacerbated by the fact that the larger Canadian provinces represent a far
larger percentage of Canadian economic (and political) activity than any one
U.S. state does in the United States. Moreover, because those who have power
are generally reluctant to cede it, we might expect that Canadian provinces-in
particular Ontario and Qu6bec-will continue to play key roles in international
trade regulation in Canada.
In addition, there is the risk that cooperation among the Canadian provinces might erode in areas where consensus ceases to exist. The pattern in Canada to date has been for consensus (albeit in possibly watered-down form) to be
reached among the provinces and the federal government-but what if consenChevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a general
discussion of the Chevron doctrine and its evolution, see Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A
Survey of Chevronfrom Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 725 (2007).
203
See supra discussion accompanying notes 132-149.
202
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sus cannot be reached? In such cases, certain aspects of Canadian international
trade policy could be immobilized, much in the way that WTO trade liberalization has ground to a halt because sufficient consensus cannot be reached.
In the United States, the opposite is likely true. Despite current Tea Party rumblings about smaller government, 204 the federal government seems unlikely to cede significant power to the states, and certainly it will not in the area of
international trade regulation, with its national security overtones and the constitutional supremacy of the federal government. This also raises interesting questions about how to define U.S. international versus domestic matters, for the
allocation of federal power in the area of U.S. international trade regulation is,
as discussed above, a matter of definition. For now, the federal government
seems to have a greater say than states as to what constitutes international traderelated activity, and what does not.
Ultimately, the desirability of the U.S. approach or the Canadian approach, or of some other balance of subnational versus federal power in international trade, would seem to come down to what is more valued: the ability to
rapidly develop and implement a country's international trade regulatory
schemes (which is facilitated by deeper federal control over such matters), or
greater involvement of various constituencies in international trade decisionmaking (which is facilitated by a broader allocation of international trade legal
authority to states or provinces, and less federal ability to preempt state or provincial decisions regarding international trade). This, in essence, is a question of
whether international trade decisions largely should be a federal prerogative or
not. That is a centrally important policy question that goes to the very heart of
federalism-and because of differences in constitutional structure, jurisprudence, demographics, and history, the question has been answered in the United
States and Canada in very different ways. It will be interesting in coming years
to see whether current political pressures in the United States lead to any greater
state involvement in foreign affairs and international trade regulatory matters,
and whether the challenges of continually achieving federal-provincial consensus in Canada lead to less provincial involvement in Canadian international
trade regulation.

204

See Tea PartyMission Statement, supra note 5.
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